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AGRICULTURAL EXPORTERS IN A PROTECTIONIST WORLD: 
REVIEW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BARRIERS AGAINST MERCOSUR 





Among the various regions of the world, the Americas is the most efficient agricultural producer; 
most other regions record an approximate trade balance or are in systematic deficit. Most Latin 
American countries are in serious crisis, and this study’s underlying hypothesis is that part of the 
crisis is ascribable to agricultural protectionism. The highest costs attendant on the Uruguay 
Round’s failure to liberalize agricultural trade fall on Latin America, an outcome that has robbed 
the Americas of opportunities to develop and reduce poverty. A selected review of the literature 
offers evidence of some of the trade and welfare costs associated with this failure in the multilateral 
trading system. There is less consensus that agricultural protectionism has also entailed financial 
costs, and that several unilateral and regional trade policies have also had negative repercussions 
for efficient agricultural exporters. This article seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge of 
the latter issues. Although the statistical analysis refers to the structure and impact of developed 
countries’ barriers on Mercosur, and particularly on Argentina and Brazil, the general conclusions 
apply to other efficient producer countries in Latin America. The analysis gives rise to policy 
suggestions on external trade strategies, but the article does not discuss the subregion’s common 
external tariff. 
 
The study is arranged as follows. Section II presents aggregate and sectoral statistics on agricultural 
trade. Section III summarizes some of the literature on the failure of the Uruguay Round to 
liberalize agricultural trade. Section IV argues that regionalism has eroded exports from the 
Mercosur countries, as evidenced by several product-specific examples. Section V discusses the 
likely impact that unilateral policies, including preferential schemes, may have on efficient 
exporters. Section VI addresses regional trade policies and supports its conclusions with product-
specific examples of how regionalism has reduced Mercosur’s agricultural exports. Section VII 
discusses the reasons why the Doha Development Round is unlikely to result in significant 
improvements in market access for agricultural products, and examines the notion that Mercosur 
is losing ground in a world that promises to continue to be characterized by domino regionalism. 
For efficient agricultural exporters, the study’s conclusion is somber: the world will continue to 
offer high protection to agriculture. What, then, should be done? Past liberalization and negotiating 
strategies have clearly failed, and something new has to be tried. The evidence gathered in this 
article is used in Section VIII to suggest that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is 
____________ 
∗  Professor at the School of Government, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and in the School of Agribusiness, Universidad 
del CEMA (e-mail: jnogues@infovia.com.ar). The author is grateful to Robert Devlin for suggesting that this study be 
written, and is thankful for the very useful comments of an anonymous referee. His thanks go also to Lic. Pablo Garcia, 
who prepared many of the tables in the study, and to Ms. María Gondell for her efficient editorial work. Remaining 
errors are my sole responsibility. The paper was commissioned by the ITD/INT. 2 
currently the salient option that holds some promise of eliminating some agricultural trade barriers 
but the costs that could be paid for expanding the regional market is not yet clear. The study ends 
with an overview section on other policy suggestions. 
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II. MERCOSUR’S  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE 
This section presents a broad picture of Mercosur member countries’ agricultural trade, highlighting 
its central importance in determining the subregion’s growth opportunities. Note that in the 
1990s, world agricultural and non-agricultural exports grew at markedly different rates: by 34% 
and 89% respectively. These different performances continue a trend of lagging agricultural trade 
that started several decades ago. Table II.1 shows that of the various world regions, Western Europe 
and the Americas (North America and Latin America) are the leading agricultural exporters. 
While the former is a net importer, however, the latter is a net exporter.
1 The table also shows that 
in the 1990s there was little variation in world regions’ shares of agricultural exports. The slight 






WORLD AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
Origin  1990  1995  2000 
     
World Agricultural Exports (US$ billions) 414  577  558 
     
           
Share (%)          
North  America  20 19 19 
Latin  America  10 10 12 
Western  Europe  45 43 41 
Eastern Europe *  3  4  4 
Africa  1 4 3 
Asia  17 19 19 
     
           
Other  4 1 2 
     
           
Memo: World Exports (US$ billions)  3,388  4,934  6,186 
     




Table II.2 shows the ratio of exports in 2000 relative to those in 1990. The swift growth of Eastern 
Europe’s exports, starting from a relatively low base, is followed by Latin America. These two 
regions’ improved export performance is mainly attributable to unilateral trade liberalization policies 
that might sometimes (see Section V) have been reinforced by regional trade agreements.
3 The 
table reveals that the most dynamic segment of agricultural trade consists of food exports, which 
grew at a substantially faster pace than agricultural raw materials in the 1990s. The sole exception 
is Latin America, where raw materials exports grew faster than food exports, although the reasons 
for this are unclear. 
____________ 
1  It is well known that most of the EU’s agricultural exports require high  subsidies. 
2  Not all Latin American countries are highly efficient agricultural producers. Mexico and some Andean Community 
countries, for example, produce several agricultural products behind high import barriers. 
3  Regional trade agreements (RTAs) usually create trade among members and divert trade against non-members. 
Some of these effects on Mercosur’s agricultural exports are analyzed in Section V. 4 
TABLE II.2 
RATIO OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY EXPORTING REGION IN 2000 TO 1990 
  Ratio for 
Origin  Total Agriculture  Food  Raw Materials 
     
North America  1.29  1.36  1.21 
Latin America  1.65  1.66  2.00 
Western Europe  1.23  1.29  1.00 
Eastern Europe *  1.85  n.a.  n.a. 
Africa 1.19  n.a.  n.a. 
Asia 1.49  1.66  1.14 
           
World  1.35  1.40  1.17 
     




Table II.3 presents the ratio of Latin America’s agricultural exports in 2000 to those in 1990 
by destination. Regional exports grew fastest. As noted below, this was also associated with 
liberalization and regional trade policies. As regards the fall in exports to Eastern Europe, it 
should be noted that in 1990, 25% of the latter’s imports originated in Latin America, but that ten 
years later the share had declined to 7.5%. In contrast, during this same period, Eastern Europe’s 




RATIO OF LATIN AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IN 2000 TO 1990 BY DESTINATION 
Destination  Total Agriculture  Food   Raw Materials 
     
North  America  2.20 2.11 0.75 
Latin  America  3.00 2.50 1.57 
Western  Europe  1.38 1.33 1.50 
Eastern Europe *  0.35  0.35  0.29 
Africa  1.79 1.84 1.50 
Asia  2.13 2.33 1.48 
World  1.65 1.66 2.00 
     
Memo: Exports in 2000 (US$ billions)  66.0  57.9  8.1 
     




Figure II.1 presents the Mercosur countries’ agricultural trade flows in the 1990s. The most 
notable feature, as noted above, is the systematic net agricultural trade surplus. Table II.4 reveals 
the high share of agricultural exports in total exports.
4 Hence reduced access to foreign markets 
____________ 
4  Except when otherwise stated, to facilitate computations the following tables and graphs identify agricultural 
exports with those of chapters 1 to 24 of the harmonized system (HS). In contrast, the WTO’s definition of agriculture 
is that of Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture (WTO [1994]). Essentially, this definition excludes Chapter 3 (fish 
and fish products) and includes a number of other products such as hides and skins, wool and animal hair, and raw 
cotton, among others. This article focuses more on broad trends than on individual products, and these differences do 
not alter its conclusions. 5 
because of agricultural protectionism entails a serious blow to regional exports and to the member 
countries’ growth prospects. As shown below, this is precisely the situation that these countries 






















SHARE OF FIVE, TEN, AND ALL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IN TOTAL EXPORTS 
(Percentages) 
Country  Numbers of Positions *  1991  2001 
      
Five 28.8  26.0 
Ten 40.0  30.7  Argentina 
All 60.4  44.4 
      
      
Five 14.8  19.3 
Ten 18.3  25.3  Brazil 
All 25.2  27.9 
      
      
Five 45.5  65.0 
Ten 49.1  69.1  Paraguay 
All 52.5  69.5 
      
      
Five 16.0  34.9 
Ten 22.0  42.6  Uruguay 
All 40.0  45.1 
      
Note: * Six digits of the Mercosur Trade Nomenclature. 
Source: IDB-INTAL [1991] and Comtrade - United Nations [2001]. 
 
 
The agricultural exports of Argentina, Brazil and Mercosur, by destination, are presented in Table 
II.5. It is clear that Mercosur itself has been the most dynamic export market, followed by sales to 
other Latin American countries. For Argentina, sales to the EU have grown least; for Brazil, the 


























actually declined. Together with other Latin American countries, the rest of the world (mainly 
comprising developing countries), has also been a dynamic destination for agricultural exports. 




AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY DESTINATION: 1990 AND 2000 
(US$ millions) 
   Mercosur  Other LAC  US  EU  Rest of World  Total 
Country 
   1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
                    
Primary  712.4 1,775.190  222.4 508.2 97.4 348.9 1,180.6 1,494.98 1,561.0 2,000.4  3,773.7 6,127.6
Processed  130.0 475.675 350.8 458.1 345.1 337.5 1,079.0 1,783.20 1,324.4  2,353.3  3,229.3 5,407.7 Argentina 
Total  842.4 2,250.860  573.2 966.3 442.5 686.3 2,259.6 3,278.20 2,885.4 4,353.7  7,003.0 11,535.3
                    
                    
Primary  52.9 267.1  27.0 189.1 506.2 562.7 1,457.1 3,214.60 941.7  2,053.7  2,984.9 6,287.0
Processed  66.1 465.5  151.8 223.2 1,216.5 632.3 2,792.0 2,628.70 1,559.3  2,740.6  5,785.7 6,690.2 Brazil 
Total  119.0 732.5  178.9 412.2 1,722.7 1,194.9 4,249.1 5,843.30 2,501.0  4,794.2  8,770.6 12,977.2
                    
                    
Primary  1,089.2 2,633.3  288.7 860.0 658.3 967.0 2,956.1 4,953.70 2,831.2  4,359.8  7,823.5 13,773.7
Processed  212.7 1,133.6  509.5 706.6 1,590.6 987.1 3,907.5 4,440.50 2,917.3  5,107.7  9,137.7 12,375.6 Mercosur 
Total  1,301.9 3,766.9  798.2 1,566.6 2,248.9 1,954.1 6,863.6 9,394.20 5,748.5  9,467.5  16,961.2 26,149.3
                    
Source: Brazil: IPEA Argentina: INDEC and All Countries: IDB-INTAL. 
 
 
Table II.6 presents net agricultural exports by region. The figures reveal that the Americas comprise 
the world’s leading net agricultural exporting region, while Africa is in relative balance and other 
regions (the rest of world) are net importers. It is of note that Europe’s agricultural trade deficit in 
2000 was narrower than in 1990. As argued below, this is because of continued protectionist trends, 





NET AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY REGIONS 
(US$ billions) 
Region  1990  2000 
    
North America  36  21 
Latin America  24  35 
Western Europe  -22  -14 
Eastern Europe  -8  -1 
Africa 0  1 
Asia -18  -27 




Finally, Table II.7 shows Argentine and Brazilian net agricultural exports by chapter of the 
harmonized system (HS). It confirms Argentina’s generalized comparative advantage and reveals 
the same pattern for Brazil, although less broadly, since in several chapters the country is a net 7 
importer: cereals (chapter 10), dairy products (4), and to a lesser extent mill products (11) and 
edible vegetables (7).
5 What is the extent of the damage inflicted by agricultural protectionism on 




NET AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: 2000 
(US$ millions) 
Argentina  Brazil 
Chapter 
Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports  Balance 
         
01  15.9 15.0  0.9  5.6 35.6  -29.9 
02  621.2 158.8 462.4  1,605.6 126.9  1,478.6 
03  822.9  26.6 796.3  227.1 274.2  -47.0 
04  408.6  34.0 374.7  25.0 378.6  -353.6 
05  15.9 17.3  -1.4  76.5 45.4 31.1 
06  1.3  15.7  -14.4  11.9 6.4 5.5 
07  211.6  35.6 176.0  21.9 171.1  -149.2 
08  451.3 164.5 286.7  369.2 190.0 179.2 
09  64.9 72.6  -7.7  1,681.1 20.9  1,660.2 
10  2,419.1  23.1 2,396.0  16.4 1,237.6  -1,221.2 
11  158.3  18.8 139.5  9.6 209.4  -199.8 
12  1,016.8 115.1 901.7  2,212.9 181.1  2,031.8 
13  1.4 30.0  -28.6  28.5 47.7  -19.2 
14  0.7 1.3  -0.6  3.9 1.8 2.2 
15  1,678.1  49.8  1,628.3  468.5 209.5 259.0 
16 180.1 90.3 89.8  337.3 25.2  312.1 
17 137.9 30.6  107.3  1,294.4 45.8  1,248.5 
18  80.1 70.3  9.8  163.2 91.3 71.9 
19  61.2 47.1 14.1  52.4 44.4  8.0 
20  306.9 127.6 179.3  1,134.4 125.0  1,009.4 
21  88.0 135.9  -47.9  571.8 111.1 460.7 
22  215.1  64.4 150.7  105.1 149.4  -44.3 
23  2,431.0 38.6  2,392.5  1,713.3 60.9  1,652.4 
24 146.8 13.5  133.3  841.5 18.3  823.2 
Total  11,535.3  1,396.6  10,138.7  12,977.2  3,807.7  9,169.5 
         
Source: INDEC (Argentina). IPEA Data (Brazil). Name of chapters in Appendix Table A.1. 
 
____________ 
5  For further comments on Mercosur’s agricultural trade, see Piñeiro and Piñeiro [2001].  
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III.  LOSING EXPORTS TO MULTILATERAL PROTECTIONISM 
Because of its lack of transparency and the fact that it allowed increases in protection levels, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) is probably one of the worst, if not the worst, 
accord in the history of the multilateral trading system under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and now the World Trade Organization (WTO). This conclusion is in contrast 
to other views, including those of the WTO, which asserts that the URAA has fostered agricultural 
output and trade by: "(i) making agricultural market access conditions more transparent, predictable 
and competitive; (ii) establishing or strengthening the link between national and international 
agricultural markets; and thus (iii) relying more prominently on the market for guiding scarce 
resources into their most productive uses…" (WTO [2001] p. 46). While some policy changes 
induced by the Agreement might have had such effects, others clearly have not and the net outcome 
is far from clear. This section starts by summarizing some salient features of the implementation 
of the Agreement, and then makes some comments on its trade and financial consequences. 
 
 
A.  Agriculture and Multilateralism: The Broken Promise of the Uruguay Round 
The ministerial declaration that launched the Uruguay Round (UR) promised that agricultural 
protectionism would be reduced. More than seventeen years have elapsed since the declaration 
was signed by the trade ministers who convened in Punta del Este in 1986 but no significant 
liberalization is evident, and in some areas agricultural protection is now higher than it was before 
the UR. Below is a brief summary of some of the main developments in the three major areas 
covered by the URAA: market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. That is followed 
by some critical comments on the application of contingent protection rules -particularly those in 
the Antidumping (AD) Agreement (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 




Of the three pillars covered by the URAA (market access, export subsidies, and domestic support), 
barriers to market access have been estimated to have inflicted the greatest damage on efficient 
agricultural exporters (see, for example, Monteagudo and Watanuki [2002]; Hoekman, et al. [2002]; 
and Gilbert and Wahl [2002]). The 1986 ministerial declaration promised that negotiations would: 
"achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture (…) by improving market access through, inter 
alia, the reduction of import barriers" (GATT [1986]). The inclusion of agriculture, in fact, was a 
condition that many developing countries made in order to agree to the start of the negotiations.
6 
____________ 
6  The grand exchange of concessions agreed in Punta del Este was that developing countries agreed to negotiate 
new areas (particularly services and intellectual property) only if there were a good prospect of liberalizing trade in 
agricultural, textiles and clothing products. The promise of liberalizing textiles and clothing is being met, but no similar 
result occurred in agriculture (Finger and Nogués [2002]). 10 
One of this section’s conclusions is that this promise has been unmet.
7 The comments that follow 
refer to industrial countries’ agricultural protectionism but it should be noted that, according to 
some estimates, the gains that efficient agricultural exporters could make from the liberalization 




It is helpful to order the comments that follow according to specific market access commitments 
included in the URAA: tariffication and base period, tariff reduction and averaging, specific 





Tariffication and base period. A brief review serves to recall some disturbing factors in the UR 
negotiations. First, the most significant obligations that countries undertook under the URAA was 
the tariffication of their non-tariff-barriers (NTBs), which had proliferated during the 1980s (Nogués, 
et al. [1987]). During the negotiations it was also agreed that the period for estimating the equivalent 
ad valorem tariffs of NTBs would be 1986-1988. These were years of low international agricultural 
prices and, since agricultural protection in industrial countries seeks to target farmers’ income 
levels, the selection of these years gave an upward bias to the base tariffs. This was bad enough, 
but for efficient exporters the situation would worsen markedly. 
 
The tariffs that emerged from the tariffication exercise, and that were notified to the WTO, were 
higher (sometimes much higher) than the true tariff equivalents of NTBs prevailing in the base 
period. These inflated tariffs have been called "dirty tariffs" and, as Table III.1 shows that tariffs 
notified and bound in the WTO exceed the tariff equivalent by 50%, and in some cases by 100%.
10 
It is remarkable that many observers base their support for the UR negotiations on the increased 
transparency -associated with the tariffication exercise- that it produced. In reality, the emergence 
____________ 
7  According to Messerlin [2002, p. 3], there is a widespread view in Europe that the URAA liberalized agricultural 
trade, which makes agreement on effective liberalization in the Doha Round all the more difficult: "The URAA did not 
deliver the liberalization dynamics it was supposed to generate. It may even have put the Doha negotiators in a 
situation worse than the one faced by the Uruguay Round negotiators a decade ago. This is because today many 
farmers and a noticeable share of public opinion in protectionist OECD countries are convinced that agriculture was 
liberalized by the Uruguay Round, and that this liberalization has been the cause of all their difficulties since 1995". 
8  For example, the World Bank estimates that agricultural liberalization by industrial countries alone would provide 
worldwide gains equivalent to US$124 billion a year, while if only developing countries liberalize the gains rise to 
US$239 billion a year (World Bank [2002], Table 6.1). 
9  State trading by several countries, such as Canada, is another source of distortions not considered in this section. 
10  How this came to be is a question that has apparently not been researched carefully. Here are two hypothesis. 
First, according to informal comments made by some trade negotiators, the notification of tariff equivalents to the 
WTO was made at the last minute before the UR concluded. After many years of frustrating talks, negotiators were 
tired and wanted to end the round, despite the fact that they sensed an outcome that was unbalanced for developing 
countries (Ricupero [1999]). Second, dirty tariffication was practiced not only by industrial countries but by several 
developing countries (Hathaway and Ingco [1996]). It should also be noted that the document "Modalities for the 
Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under the Reform Program" (GATT [1993]) provided the guidelines 
for the tariffication exercise. Since the modalities document was not binding, however, countries were not bound to 
use the guidelines and formulas it indicated. Furthermore, because this document is not part of the WTO agreements, 
efficient agricultural exporters were left without legal recourse against the negative export effects of dirty tariffs (Finger 
and Nogués [2002]). 11 
of dirty tariffs is probably one of the most obscure episodes in the 50-plus years of the multilateral 
trade negotiations. For some products the situation is so bad that even if there is significant trade 
liberalization in the Doha Round, the resulting protection levels could be higher than before the 
UR. If this happens, two multilateral negotiations will have failed completely to lower agricultural 
protectionism in many of the most protected sectors. Such a failure has significant costs for efficient 
exporters and casts doubt on the benefits of the multilateral trading system for these economies. 
This runs counter to the WTO’s view that the Agreement on Agriculture has strengthened the 
links between domestic and international markets. If anything, dirty tariffs have delinked and 




TARIFFICATION OF NTBS BY THE EU AND THE US 
EU  Tariff equivalent  Bound tariffs in 2000  Bound tariffs/ 
Tariff equivalents 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
     
Wheat 68  109  1.60 
Coarse grains  89  121  1.36 
Rice 103  231  2.24 
Bovine meat  97  87  0.90 
Other meat  27  34  1.26 
Dairy products  147  205  1.39 
Sugar 144  279  1.94 
Average EU  45  73  1.63 
Average US  13  23  1.77 
      
Source: Ingco [1995]. 
 
 
Tariff reduction and averaging. Industrial countries pledged to reduce agricultural tariffs by 36% on 
a simple average basis, and committed themselves to a minimum reduction of 15% at the product 
level. These commitments on reductions were based on the levels of the dirty tariffs. Many countries, 
moreover, used the degrees of freedom implied by simple averaging to minimize liberalization. 
They did this by applying proportionally higher reductions to the lowest tariffs. To what extent was 
this freedom used? Roberts [1999] has estimated that on a trade-weighted basis, the proportional 
reduction was 15% instead of 36%, which means that very little liberalization took place in highly 
protected products such as sugar and dairy goods which are major exports of the Mercosur countries. 
 
 
Specific tariffs and other convoluted forms of protection. The tariffication exercise also produced 
many specific tariffs and more convoluted forms of tariff protection. By making the level of 
protection contingent on the level of international prices, specific tariffs distort the pattern of 
production and trade more than ad valorem tariffs. Additionally, since international prices are 
highly volatile, specific tariffs add another element of uncertainty to international trade flows. 
Even worse is the fact that for some seasonal products, specific tariffs vary by time of year and 12 
entry (CIF) price. The closer the month to harvest time, and the lower the import price, the higher 
the specific tariffs. This, for example, is how the EU protects vegetables and fruits (WTO [1999]). 
Among the Quad countries, only Japan has a proportion of non-ad valorem tariff bindings in 
agricultural products below 20%. The proportion for the other three members (Canada, the EU and 
the United States), lies between 20% and 50% (WTO [2001]), and thus a high share of agricultural 




Tariff escalation and dispersion. Tariff escalation remains a salient feature of agricultural 
protectionism, one with serious repercussions for efficient exporters. Pronounced escalation 
eliminates industrialization (and therefore employment) opportunities for efficient developing 
country agricultural producers. Although tariff escalation must be analyzed at the product level, it 
is interesting to note that for some countries and some agro-industrial products, the effects seem 
to be very detrimental. In 1996, for example, Canada applied an average tariff on fully processed 
food products of 45%, and of only 2.2% on primary products (OECD [2001]; Lindland [1997]). 
 
Tariff escalation and tariff peaks increase the variability of protection structures, with negative 
consequences for the countries imposing them and for exporting countries. It is impossible to 
measure this dispersion with precision because of the incidence of specific tariffs, but it is estimated 
to be much higher for agricultural tariffs than for industrial tariffs. For the EU, the WTO has 
estimated a standard deviation of 3.6% and 22.1% for bound manufactured and agricultural 
products, respectively (WTO [2001], Table III.3). 
 
 
Tariff quotas. Tariff quotas is another instrument to bloom from the UR obligation to provide 
minimum market access. Usually, such access is equivalent to around 5% of domestic consumption 
in the base period.
12 Importing countries concluded that tariff quotas provided an appropriate 
instrument for implementing this obligation; presumably low in-quota tariffs would facilitate 
imports up to a threshold level above which the tariff usually rises very steeply. Table III.2 shows 
the distribution of tariff quota items for the Quad countries by product categories. Clearly, the bulk 
of quota items correspond to dairy products, meat, and fruits and vegetables which are important 
export products of the Mercosur countries. 
 
A few comments illustrate the significant distortions that tariff quotas have on international trade. 
First, as mentioned, out-of-quota tariffs are usually so high as to preclude imports. The simple 
average in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates are: Canada, 8% and 203%; the EU, 8% and 45%, 
Japan, 20% and 274%; and the United States, 10% and 29% (OECD [2001]). Second, the most 
recent estimates indicate that the fill rate of quotas has been declining and is well below 100%: 
the simple average fill rate for OECD countries declined from 67% in 1995 to 63% in 1998. 
____________ 
11  More convoluted forms of protection than those for seasonal products can also be found. Finding the protection for 
chocolates, for example, involves two steps. The first involves defining the input contents and a multiple entry table 
indicates code numbers corresponding to different input mixes. Then, in another table, that code number defines the 
level of protection. Thus the code number for chocolates having 1% starch, 2% fat, 20% milk protein and 25% sugar is 
7161. For this code, the second table defines a specific tariff that has to be added to the corresponding ad valorem 
tariff. This is a good example of made-to-measure protection. 
12  According to the WTO, the "size of the quotas were to increase from 3% of the 1986-1988 base period domestic 
consumption in 1995 to 5% at the end of the implementation period" (WTO [2001] p. 51). 13 
Third, although low levels of fill rates could be explained by demand factors or lack of product 
availability in exporting countries, many observers suspect that the explanation should be sought in 
the different ways of administering the quotas. For example, some quotas are allocated to specific 
countries in such a discriminatory way that they clearly run counter to multilateral disciplines. 
Some 34 tariff quotas in the United States and 19 in the EU are allocated on a country-specific 
basis, the latter mainly to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries and to 
Central and Eastern European countries. In the case of butter and milk, New Zealand benefits from 
specific quota allocations by the EU and Canada. Obviously, this goes some way to explaining 
why New Zealand is one of the most successful agricultural exporters. More generally, allocations 
to specific countries is most prevalent for dairy products, sugar and beef, some of Latin America’s 
leading export products. Other forms of quota allocations include first-come, first-served; auctioning; 
historical importers; licenses on demand; producers’ associations; state enterprises; and allocations 
by exporting countries. Except perhaps for auctioning, each of the other forms of allocation can be 
administered in ways that ensure quota fill rates are under 100% (see, for example, OECD [2001] 
and Josling, et al. [1996]). When this is the case, two things happen. First the links between domestic 
and international markets are weakened or eliminated. Second, these ways of administering quota 
allocations negate the spirit of the URAA, wherein negotiators accepted in good faith that minimum 





NUMBER OF TARIFF QUOTAS OF THE QUAD COUNTRIES 
Product Category  Canada  EU  Japan  US 
      
Cereals 4  15  4  1 
Oilseeds  1 0 1 2 
Sugar  0 3 0 6 
Dairy  11 12 12 24 
Meat 4  28  0  1 
Eggs  1 3 0 0 
Beverages  0 1 0 0 
Fuits & Vegetables  0  25  1  5 
Tobacco  0 0 0 1 
Fibers  0 0 1 7 
Coffee,  etc.  0 0 0 7 
Other  0 0 1 0 
Total  21  87  20  54 
      
Source: WTO [(2001) Table III.3]. 
 
 
Special agricultural safeguards. Despite all the above-mentioned trade instruments, which offer 
any industrial country that so desires the freedom to maintain and in some cases increase protection 
levels, URAA negotiators developed an additional instrument: special agricultural safeguards 
____________ 
13  Research on the economic effects of the quota-administration has been scant, and more work is necessary. 14 
(SSGs). The products eligible for protection under this instrument are those that underwent a 
tariffication of NTBs, and the protection can only be invoked after the quotas are filled. The most 
clear protectionist loophole of these safeguards is that they can be implemented without the injury 
test; they are triggered by certain negotiated threshold levels on import prices and quantities.
14 It 
is an aberration of the multilateral system to have allowed the application of special safeguards to 
products for which dirty tariffs are in place. 
 
In the URAA, eight OECD countries retained the right to use SSGs on their tariffied products. The 
following numbers of product categories, for example, are eligible to receive SSGs: Canada, 150; 
the EU, 539; Japan, 121; and the United States, 189. The percentage of these tariff lines provided 
with SSGs are: Canada, 10%; the EU, 31%; Japan, 12%; and the United States, 9% (OECD [2001]). 
The actual use of SSGs is far less than the potential use but this does not make them innocuous, 
for at least two reasons. First, the SSG implies that the tariffication process retains a high degree 
of uncertainty. Second, some countries using SSGs seem to have abused the spirit of the URAA 
by establishing trigger prices that are well above those indicated in the Agreement. Article 5 (1b) 
indicates that SSGs can be implemented when import prices fall below the trigger price, which is 
"equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the product concerned". Nevertheless, a 
footnote allows higher prices and thus removes much of the value of this rule, asserting that "the 
reference price used to invoke the provisions of this subparagraph shall, in general, be the average 
CIF unit value of the product concerned, or otherwise shall be an appropriate price in terms of the 
quality of the product and its stage of processing…" (WTO [1995], p. 43). Since the rate of 
protection provided by an SSG is an inverse function of the proportion by which import prices 
fall below the reference or trigger price, biasing this price upwards also biases the level of 
protection upwards. For example, the external reference price that the EU should use for beef is 
€1,526 per ton but instead it has used €2,310 euros per tonne -a difference of 51%-. There are 
many other examples of this kind of obscure protectionism, which is allowed by the establishment 




GATT Article XVI banned export subsidies for industrial products but not those for agricultural 
goods. Increasing protection in the most important OECD countries led to the overproduction of 
many goods that, in view of their high cost, could only be disposed of in international markets if 
they were subsidized. This led to a proliferation of subsidies that further worsened already very 
distorted world agricultural markets. The URAA sought to limit this worrisome trend, and the 
promise of the Punta del Este ministerial declaration was that negotiations would discipline: "the 
use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural 




14  To give an idea of the protectionist effect of eliminating the injury test, recall that between 1980 and 1992 the 
International Trade Commission found injury in 66% of cases, while in the same period the DOC found a positive 
margin of dumping in 93% of cases (Irwin [2002] pp. 115-117). When injury is absent, the products involved in these 
antidumping petitions do not receive protection. 15 
Article 9 of the URAA lists six categories of subsidies, contingent on export performance, that 
would be subject to reduction obligations.
15 The Agreement obliges industrial countries to reduce 
the base (1986-1990) period volume of subsidized exports by 21%, and the budgetary outlays by 
36% over six years. By the end of this period, the budgetary limits for the Quad countries were: 
Canada, US$308 million; the EU, US$8,896 million; and the United States, US$594 million.
16 
Total subsidies permitted to these three countries is equivalent to 77% of the total allowed to all 
WTO members that reported using export subsidies during the base period.
17 Clearly, the EU is 
by far the world’s leading subsidizer, accounting for the bulk of the damage inflicted on the 
multilateral trading system in general and on efficient producers in particular.
18 
 
For 1998, Table III.3 shows the commitment levels and notified subsidized exports (both in metric 
tonnes), as well as the relation of commitment to world exports in 1995. Although in general the 
notified volume of subsidized exports is below the commitment levels, several products receive 
subsidies for more than 50% of commitment levels, including coarse grains, skim milk powder, 
cheese, other milk products, bovine meat, pigmeat, poultry meat and eggs. The threat to the trading 
system, and in particular the inhibiting effects on efficient producers and exporters, is better 
represented by the commitment levels than by the notified levels, for two reasons. First, given 
that these producers cannot know in advance what the levels of effective or notified exports will 
be, safe investment and production decisions must take account of the commitment levels. Second, 
what they do know is that notified subsidies granted by the most important OECD countries tend 
to increase and come closer to the commitment levels when international prices are falling.
19 In 
any case, the last column of Table III.3 offers an estimate of the proportion of world exports that 
can be subsidized under existing commitment levels. The figures show several products (wheat 
and wheat flour, butter and butter oil, skim milk powder, cheese, pigmeat, tobacco and cotton) for 
which over 30% of world exports could be subsidized. 
 
Table III.4 presents estimates of the rates of export subsidies provided by the EU and the United 
States. It is important to note that, unlike barriers to market access, especially tariffs, in the case 
of export subsidies there are no bound rates. Export subsidy rates, moreover, can vary from year 
to year, compounding uncertainty and distortions in the trading system.
20 The economic principle 
that guides the setting of import tariffs are no different from that guiding export subsidies: low 
and uniform rates lead to a better allocation of resources than high and variable rates. The figures 
for the EU reveal a sharp contrast to this principle. While the lowest export subsidy rates 
during the 1995-1997 period were for wheat and eggs, products like sugar and pigmeat received 
astronomically high rates of over 150%. 
____________ 
15  These include direct payments by governments to firms, industries or producers contingent on export performance; 
subsidized stock exports; producer-financed export subsidies; export marketing cost subsidies; export-specific 
transportation subsidies, and subsidies on goods incorporated into exports. 
16  Japan does not use export subsidies. 
17  Countries that did not use export subsidies in the base period were not allowed to introduce them. 
18  Including the EU; among WTO members, only 25 agreed to reduction commitments under the URAA. 
19  In 1998, international agricultural prices had begun to decline and this trend continued for a number of years. It 
might also be said that in some cases the levels of notified subsidies varies quite substantially from year to year. For 
example, in 1997 the notified level of subsidies granted to coarse grains were 8,826 thousand metric tonnes; in 1998 
this level rose by 73% to 15,311 thousand metric tonnes. 
20  For example, in 1996 the export subsidy rate granted by the EU to pigmeat was 127%; in 1997 the figure rose to 
337% (OECD [2001] Table 4.7). 16 
 
TABLE III.3 
COMMITMENT AND NOTIFICATION VOLUMES OF SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS IN 1998 
(METRIC TONS) UNDER THE URAA FOR DIFFERENT PRODUCT CATEGORIES 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Products  Commitment  Notified  (2)/(1)  World Exports *  (1)/(4) 
         
Wheat & Wheat Flour  48,277  14,023  29.0  116,000  41.6 
Coarse  Grains  21,129  15,311 72.5  90,000 23.5 
Rice 628  144  22.9  21,000  3.0 
Oilseeds 2,491  0  0,00  46,000  5.4 
Vegetable  Oils  1,529  10 0.7  32,000 4.8 
Oil Cakes  308  0  0,00  n.a.  n.a. 
Sugar  4,243  1,884 44.4  34,000 12.5 
Butter and Butter Oil  529  167  31.6  800  66.1 
Skim Milk Powder  646  380  58.8  1,000  64.6 
Cheese  460  253 55.0 1,000 46.0 
Other  Milk  Products  1,342 1,06 79.0  60,000  2.2 
Bovine  Meat  1,258  729 57.9 5,000 25.2 
Pig meat  605  748  123.6  2,000  30.3 
Poultry  Meat  644  370 61.2 4,000 16.1 
Sheep  Meat  26  1 3.8 900 2.9 
Live  Animals  123 5  4.1  694,000 0 
Eggs 114  116  101.8  1,000  11.4 
Wine  485  7 1.4  5,000 9.7 
Fruits & Vegetables  6,904  2,407  34.9  101,000  6.8 
Tobacco 222  7  3.2  3  7,400.0 
Cotton 89  0  0.0  69  129.0 
        
Notes: * Figures correspond to 1995. 




EXPORT SUBSIDY RATES: AVERAGE 1995-1997 
Country and Product  Subsidy Rate (%) 
   
European Union    
Wheat and wheat flour  15 
Coarse grains (barley)  32 
Rice 145 
Sugar 154 
Butter and butter oil  118 
Skim milk powder  39 
Cheese 43 
Beef meat  57 
Pig meat  173 
Poultry meat  20 
Eggs 15 
   
     
United States    
Butter and butter oil  58 
Skim milk powder  44 
Cheese 39 
   
Source: WTO [2001, Table 4.7]. 
 17 
Other problems are attendant on the export subsidies granted by the major industrial countries. 
First, just as low international prices in the base year facilitated the binding of tariff rates at high 
levels, those same prices also facilitated the binding of high levels of export subsidies. Some 
observers have gone so far as to assert that: "the provisions of the URAA (on the base period for 
export subsidies), even allow leeway for an increase in trade distortions…" (OECD [2001] p. 82). 
Second, in the EU the "extensive use of the roll-over flexibility provision, export subsidy 
budgetary outlays in the first four years of the implementation were above the final bound levels 
in 2000-2001 for a number of commodities …" (OECD [2001] p. 83).
21 Other countries used this 
facility, but the EU has used it the most by far. In every year for which data is available, the EU 
has overshot its annual export subsidy commitments in a number of products, including rice, 
olive oil, bovine meat, wine, sugar, and poultry meat (WTO [2001] Table 4.5). Third, the Peace 
Clause (URAA Article 13), severely limited the application of countervailing measures against 
export subsidies that conform to the Agreement. This Clause expired on December 31, 2003 and 
the Mercosur countries should use this opportunity to open disputes against all countries whose 
subsidies damage their exports. Fourth, in addition to the list of export subsidies stipulated explicitly 
in Article 9 of the URAA there are others that, while not included and therefore not subject to 
reduction commitments, also have the potential to distort trade. These include, among others, 
officially-supported export credits and credit guarantees. The available data indicate that the 
volume of these credits is increasing fast: for a sample of countries they have gone from a stock 
of US$5.5 billion in 1995 to US$7.9 billion in 1998 -an increase of 44%-. This can be taken as an 
indication that the absence of multilateral disciplines in this area is being used to substitute for 
the liberalizing effects of the policies covered by the URAA.
22 
 
Fifth, food aid allowed by the URAA can have effects similar to export subsidies when such aid 
is tied to commercial exports. Sixth, by subsidizing crucial inputs, some countries have covered a 
higher subsidized volume than agreed in the URAA. Exports of cheese by the EU is one example; 
other trading partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), have held 
consultations on the extent to which subsidies for inputs violate the rules on anti-circumvention 
of the URAA (OECD [2001] pp. 87-88). Finally, a number of serious deficiencies in the data have 
also been uncovered (OECD [2001] p. 88). In the URAA, for example, export subsidy limits are 
defined by commodity categories, but some of these are so broad that many degrees of freedom are 
left to switch subsidies among products within categories. As some authors argue: "Export subsidy 
limits on both expenditures and physical quantities are also negated somewhat by aggregation 
across products and over time" (Ruiz and de Gorter [2002] p. 228). Finally, there have also been 




There are also serious doubts that the policies agreed under the URAA have done much to 
discipline domestic assistance measures. Negotiators attempted to separate domestic policies 
having no effect on trade (like government supported research) from those that do have clear trade- 
____________ 
21  The rules on roll-over permissiveness are established in Article 9 (b) of the URAA. 
22  The United States is the biggest user of export credits, accounting for 46% of total (OECD [2001] p. 85). The 
URAA called for a separate agreement on the use of these instruments (Article 10), but as of the time of writing some 
members continue to voice strong disagreement and there is no such accord. 18 
and production-distorting effects (like the government fixing a minimum purchase price). The 
former were included under what is called the "green box" and the latter under the "amber box". 
Policies in the amber box are subject to reduction commitments; those in the green box are not, 
and the assistance may even be increased. 
 
In addition to the green box, three other forms of assistance are unaffected by the reduction 
commitments (all three are listed in Article 6 of the URAA). They correspond to: (i) developmental 
objectives in developing countries; (ii) de minimis levels, according to which 5% (10% in the 
case of developing countries) of the contributions in the amber box are exempted; and (iii) direct 
payments for production-limiting programs or the "blue box", which is used mainly by the EU. 
 
Policies under the green box are listed in Annex 2 of the URAA. It is noteworthy that direct 
payments can be put in the green box provided that they are "decoupled" from production, including 
decoupled income support, income insurance, and safety nets. Given the freedom to increase 
domestic assistance levels under the green box, it is unsurprising that there has been such an 
increase in several developed countries. Between the base period (1986-1988) and 1997, for 
example, the following increases in green box subsidies were recorded: the EU, from US$10.1 
billion to US$20.6 billion; Japan, from US$15.0 billion to US$21.9 billion; and the United States, 
from US$24.1 billion to US$51.2 billion. 
 
Under the URAA, industrial countries undertook to reduce the value of domestic assistance granted 
by amber box policies (aggregate measure of support, AMS) in the base period by 20% over a 
six-year period. The following figures, which show the reduction of AMS from the base period to 
1997, indicate that this obligation has been met: the EU, from US$80.7 billion to US$56.9 billion; 
Japan, from US$33.8 billion to US$26.2 billion; and the United States, from US$23.9 billion to 
US$6.2 billion.
23 As indicated below, the economic impact of this compliance is diluted not only 
by the massive increase in green box subsidies but also by several other considerations. 
 
It is important to note that some of the increased assistance provided by policies under the green 
box might in fact not be as decoupled as argued by those WTO members that defend them. Other 
observers have raised serious doubts as to whether policies under the green box are in fact 
decoupled, and some have gone so far as to argue that: "it is doubtful if there are any policies that 
really do not affect production decisions" (OECD [2001] p. 64). These kind of conclusions cast a 
large shadow of doubt on the effectiveness of the URAA to discipline domestic assistance policies 
(see also World Bank and IMF [2002]). 
 
In addition to the serious criticisms of the notion of decoupled subsidies and the effects of green 
box policies, several other considerations raise further doubts as to the effectiveness of the URAA. 
First, because of low international prices in the base period, domestic policies afforded very high 
levels of assistance. Reducing these levels by 20%, as industrial countries agreed, might involve 
no effective movement towards market-based decisions if more recent years have witnessed higher 
international prices. Second, the levels of AMS in the base period proved to be inflated by policies 
that more recently were transferred to the blue box, which is free from reduction commitments. Thus 
it is possible for a country to have complied with the URAA simply by making and notifying this 
____________ 
23  In the base period, these three countries provided 83% of the total AMS notified to the WTO (OECD [2001]). 19 
switch to the WTO. Third, the commitment to reduce the AMS at the aggregate and not the 
product level means that assistance to specific commodities can be increased. Fourth, the AMS 
excludes support provided by protection. Fifth, there is a presumption that blue box policies are 
more distortionary than green box policies, although they are also excluded from the URAA 
obligations.
24 Sixth, there are also suspicions that deductions from the AMS on account of taxed 
products have not always been well administered, and that levels of production affected by price 
support policies are being under-reported. Finally, it is important to stress that there is relatively 




On December 10, 2001 the US Department of Commerce (DOC) announced the imposition of 
steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China (ranging from 33% to 
184%), and countervailing duties against Argentina (5.9%). These are the latest measures taken 
by the United States in a history of support to its honey industry spanning more than 50 years. 
Despite this assistance, production has continued to lag behind consumption and the US import 
ratio has been increasing. Argentina’s honey exports, by contrast, increased from 40,000 tonnes in 
1990, to 88,000 tonnes in 2000. Clearly, the claims against Argentina and China had more to do 
with a declining industry than with any wrongdoing on the part of honey producers in developing 
countries. 
 
Several DOC decisions reflect some of the things that are wrong with current multilateral trade 
rules. The antidumping investigation is used as an illustration here but similar lessons can be 
learned from the subsidy investigation (Nogués [2002]). As is well known, "normal value" can be 
estimated in a number of ways, one of which is based on the actual cost of production. In order 
to follow this line of enquiry, a random sample of Argentine beekeepers were sent a 40-page 
questionnaire in English. In Argentina, as in many other countries, most beekeepers are very poor 
people and it comes as no surprise that they could not answer the lengthy and sophisticated 
questionnaire. Thus the first lesson from this investigation is that under current multilateral rules, 
there are some producers who cannot meet the high standards enforced by industrial countries. 
These rules assume that a beekeeper has the same capacity as Coca Cola to meet high standards. 
This assumption is not reality; it is a parody of reality. 
 
Given the lack of response to the questionnaire, the second example of why these rules are wanting 
relates to the DOC decision to use the "best available information", which happened to be that 
provided by US beekeepers. There is strong evidence that this information severely overestimated 
the cost of production, and therefore the dumping margin of honey imports from Argentina. It is 
paradoxical that the second-best alternative to high quality standards implicit in the questionnaire 
that beekeepers could not answer was the use of "trash" numbers. The lesson from this experience 
is that multilateral rules should indicate that antidumping measures cannot be imposed unless the 
standards of the statistical analysis are high enough (Ibidem).
25 
____________ 
24  Measures to limit production can be ineffective when farmers set aside their least productive land. 
25  Lindsey [2000] shows that of all the methods of estimating normal value, on average the DOC has found the 
highest margin of dumping using "facts or best information available". 20 
The final issue refers to the longstanding criticisms of US antidumping regulations, according to 
which duties are assessed retroactively. This regulation essentially increases the importers’ risks 
in continuing to import from a country under investigation. The US system is quite unique in this 
respect and, as the honey case showed, has been found to have strong import-inhibiting effects 
(Staiger and Wolak [1996]). Figure III.1 shows the chilling effect that this investigation had on 
US honey imports in 2001, when most of the work was completed by the DOC. Between May 
2001, when the preliminary positive finding was issued, and December 2001, when the final 
antidumping duty order was announced, US honey imports from Argentina were in the order of 
900 tonnes. During the same months of 2000, these imports reached 29,400 tonnes; on an annualized 
























Other observers have expressed serious criticisms of how existing antidumping regulations do not 
offer agricultural producers a fair opportunity to defend themselves from accusations of being 
unfair traders (Palmeter [1989]). This topic is gaining prominence as the share of agricultural 
products covered by antidumping investigations continues to increase (Regmi [2002]). One 
conclusion from these brief comments is that if leaders want the Doha negotiations to reduce 
poverty effectively, the multilateral rules on contingent protection have to be modified. 
 
 
B.  Trade and Financial Consequences of Agricultural Protectionism 
The picture that emerges from the above analysis points to a substantial failure of the URAA to 
liberalize agricultural markets. Estimates of nominal protection coefficients, calculated as the 
price gap between domestic and world prices as a percentage of world prices (see Table III.5) 























































































each and every convolution of this Agreement (special safeguards, administration of tariff-quotas, 
specific tariffs, export subsidies and so on) has significant economic effects that can stem from 
bureaucratic decisions that facilitate rent-seeking activities on the part of agricultural lobbies. The 
evidence suggests that these rent-seeking activities can be extremely costly, not only to the trading 
system but also to the countries that practice discretionary protectionism (Krueger [1974]). All of 




NOMINAL PROTECTION COEFFICIENTS IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1995-1999 




    
Wheat 22  12 
Maize 5  3 
Other grains  31  14 
Oil seeds  9  3 
Refined sugar  100  42 
Rice 411  102 
Milk 120  22 
Beef and veal  39  10 
Pig meat  22  9 
Sheep meat  16  14 
Poultry meat  13  4 
Eggs 20  5 
All 78  18 
    
Source: OECD [2001]. 
 
 
It is doubtful whether the trade effects of the URAA can be wholly disentangled because: (i) the 
time that has elapsed since the start of the implementation period is too short; (ii) in conjunction 
with the implementation of the URAA other trade policies -including most prominently an 
increasing number of trade agreements- continue to change the international structure of incentives 
for agricultural production; and (iii) there are also difficulties in extricating the effects of trade 
policies from those of other cyclical policies, and from swings in economic activities. Given these 
difficulties, what follows is a summary of some of the findings presented in the literature. Thereafter 
are some brief comments on price instability, and on the financial effects of agricultural protectionism 




Using import to domestic consumption ratios, Diakosavvas [2001] has carried out statistical 
analysis to test whether there are differences between the situations prevailing before and after 
the URAA came into effect. For this purpose he divided the series of import-penetration ratios 
into two groups, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. The results, presented in Table III.6, confirm that 
with the exception of wheat there are no statistically significant differences between the pre-UR 
and the post-UR averages. On these grounds, and taking into account the limitations mentioned 22 
earlier, the present author agrees with the conclusions of a number of other writers and organizations 
that the URAA has done little or nothing to improve the access of agricultural products to the 





PRE- AND POST-UR AGRICULTURAL IMPORT RATIOS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
Import Ratios 
Product 
Pre-UR (1)  Post-UR (2)  (2)-(1) 
     
Wheat *  0,10  0,11  0,01 
Coarse grains  0,11  0,11  0,00 
Oilseeds 0,31  0,32  0,01 
Refined sugar  0,25  0,23  -0,02 
Butter 0,05  0,05  0,01 
Cheese 0,05  0,05  0,01 
Milk powder  0,10  0,08  -0,02 
Beef 0,13  0,14  0,01 
Poultry meat  0,03  0,04  0,01 
     
Note: * Post-UR is statistically different from pre-UR. 
Source: Diakosavvas [2001]. 
 
 
Price Level and Price Instability 
By opening markets, trade liberalization increases the volume of world trade and stabilizes 
international prices. Furthermore, an effective liberalization of agricultural trade would reduce 
world supplies, which in turn would raise world prices. As mentioned, however, there is no hard 
evidence to support the conclusion that the URAA has given rise to effective liberalization. 
 
It is worth noting that one study has concluded that "dirty tariffication" led not to an increase but 
a decline in agricultural prices. These findings are presented in an economy-wide model that 
measured the impact of the URAA on the ratio of agricultural to manufactured prices. The UR 
also liberalized manufactures and, since liberalization of agriculture starts from a much higher 
level of protection than that of manufactures, Goldin and Mensbrugghe [1996] sought to capture 
the impact of the Round on this relative price. Their findings are presented in Table III.7. It is 
unsurprising that effective liberalization would have raised the relative prices of the most protected 
agricultural products (dairy goods, sugar, wheat and beef) quite substantially. Because of dirty 
tariffication, however, the relative price of most agricultural products declined. Clearly, this is 
further confirmation of the negative effects of the URAA on world agricultural markets. 
 
Second, there is also a link between protectionism and price instability. Those countries that set 
the instruments of agricultural protectionism by targeting farm-gate prices insulate domestic 
producers from international market signals, which increases the instability of international prices 
____________ 
26  Other recent analyses casting serious doubts on the trade liberalization consequences of the URAA include the 
recent joint document by the World Bank and IMF [2002]. 23 
(Sampson and Snape [1980]). This has negative effects on agricultural producers in efficient 





IMPACT OF TARIFFICATION ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL 




Clean  Dirty 
    
Wheat 10  1 
Rice 4  -1 
Coarse grains  5  0 
Sugar 11  -1 
Beef and veal  6  0 
Other meat  2  -1 
Dairy products  12  -1 
Vegetable oils  5  -1 
Coffee -1  -2 
Cocoa 0  -1 
Tea 1  -2 
Other foods  -1  -1 
Cotton 1  -1 
Other agriculture  3  -1 
    




The traditional models for assessing the effects of agricultural protectionism, such as those 
discussed above, underestimate its economic effects to a greater or lesser degree. The reason for 
this is that the lower level of exports that can be attributed to the quantitative and price effects of 
the protectionism worsens the solvency indicators of efficient developing country exporters. In 
indebted countries, such as many of those in Latin America, this deterioration raises bond spreads 
and therefore domestic interest rates. Table III.8, for example, shows that if the elasticity of bond 
spreads (or country risk), relative to a solvency indicator like the debt service to export ratio, lies 
between 0.5 and 1, then interest rates could increase between 10% and 20% if export losses 
caused by agricultural protectionism amount to 25%, a figure that is within the range of possible 
effects of agricultural trade liberalization. This impact increases financial costs (particularly for 
small firms) and slows the growth rate (Nogués [2003]). The issue is particularly important to 
many Latin America countries that are heavily indebted but are also efficient agricultural producers. 
 
In this regard it is worth recalling that the negotiating agendas in both the FTAA and the WTO 
talks do not include the links between trade and debt. It is paradoxical, and perhaps an indication of 
the weakness of heavily indebted countries, that the issue of trade and finance is not a negotiating 
issue. In the WTO, for example, this matter is addressed in a Working Group. Trade and debt are two 24 
issues that are more closely linked than, say, trade and competition, or trade and the environment. 
Yet while these latter matters of particular interest to industrial countries are included in several 




EXPORTS AND COUNTRY RISK, ARGENTINA 2000 
  Loss (1) 
  25%  50% 
















1.0  20% 33% 
Notes:  (1) Export losses from protectionism as a percent of base 
exports. 
  (2) Elasticity of country risk with respect to debt-service 
ratio. 




This state of affairs should not continue. One possibility is that Latin America could gather support 
for putting the issue on the table for substantive negotiations in the Doha Round. Agricultural 
protectionism in the EU and Japan can persist, in part because they face no international costs. The 
strength of the world economy could be increased if they incurred some costs for their actions. 
Including trade and debt in the multilateral negotiations, and creating multilateral disciplines, 





The 1986 ministerial declaration that launched the UR promised to liberalize world agricultural 
trade. This has not happened. It is true that today we know more about the different dimensions 
of agricultural protectionism but this knowledge, which some regard as an indication of increased 
transparency, has come at a high price. That price includes: (i) protection levels for many products 
that are higher today than before the UR; (ii) for those products whose tariffication might have 
been correct, other forms of protection -including special safeguards and export subsidies- can 
easily provide increased levels of protection; (iii) frustration with the promise that tariff quotas 
would be managed transparently, and would give rise to greater market access; (iv) the creation 
of a regime to regulate domestic assistance policies that is highly opaque, and about which there 
are serious doubts as to whether it has entailed any liberalization; (v) multilateral rules on contingent 
protection that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for agricultural producers to defend 
themselves from accusations of being "unfair traders"; and (vi) the creation of protection instruments 
that leave too many decisions to be taken by bureaucrats and that therefore facilitate rent-seeking. 25 
Because of continued high protection in OECD countries, the URAA has had no clear trade effects. 
In particular, non-fulfillment of the promise that protection would be reduced means that the 
biggest players among OECD countries have not improved access to their markets: in quantitative 
terms, imports to consumption ratios have remained stable. Second, dirty tariffication is most 
likely to have reduced the level of world agricultural prices. Finally, the targeting by industrial 
countries of farmers’ income levels means that in order to avoid excess supplies from depressing 
domestic prices, the resulting excess production has benefited from export subsidies (subsidies 
that until recently remained protected by the Peace Clause). This widens the price variability to 
producers who take decisions in countries such as the Mercosur member states, whose trade policies 
are generally characterized by stable ad valorem tariffs. World agricultural markets remain in 




27  It is interesting to note that against the goal of targeting the income level of farmers, agricultural protectionism by 
industrial countries is also costly and ineffective. One study concludes that up to 80% of agricultural transfers may not 
translate into higher incomes for farmers (OECD [1996a]), and a more recent analysis concludes that in the case of 
market price support, the most important category of agricultural policies, only 10% reach the farmer. The rest of the 
transfer is divided as follows: (i) 36% goes to input suppliers; (ii) 13% goes to non-farm landowners; (iii) 13% goes to 
increase the price of farm household land; and (iv) 28% is pure resource cost (OECD [2002]).  
 27 
IV.  LOSING EXPORTS TO REGIONALISM 
Regional trade agreements are more likely to have negative effects on non-members according to 
how large and protected they are. This section is concerned solely with highlighting the negative 
effects of such accords on Mercosur agricultural exports, and the two obvious places to look for 
these effects are the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU. In general, the 
literature has concluded that NAFTA has created more trade than it has diverted, for two main 
reasons (Krueger [1999]): first, the member countries have open economies; and second, the 
agreement hastened growth, which is partly a result of differences in the members’ countries 
patterns of comparative advantage. In spite of this broad favorable picture of NAFTA, in this 
section I provide evidence of diversion effects against Argentina. 
 
The literature’s views on the broad effects of the EU are in marked contrast to those on NAFTA, 
since there is clear evidence that in the former case the trade diversion effects have been particularly 
significant (Soloaga and Winters [undated]; Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1997]). This is particularly 
true for agricultural products (Diao, et al. [2001]). Finally, although NAFTA and the EU are by 
far the largest trade agreements, smaller regional agreements can also have negative effects on 
Mercosur’s exports. Some comments on this are made below. 
 
 
A.  Impact of Successive Enlargements of the EU 
With the creation of the European Community (EC) and its subsequent deepening and enlargement, 
Western Europe has been the region that has gone furthest with regional trade strategies. Of note 
here are some of the trade effects that successive enlargements have had on Mercosur’s agricultural 
exports. The enlargements are as follows: (i) Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973; 
(ii) Greece in 1981; (iii) Spain and Portugal in 1986; and (iv) Austria, Finland and Sweden in 
1995. More recently, the EU announced that it will be accepting ten new members, most of them 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). There follows a review of some of the literature 
on the impact of successive enlargements on diversion in agricultural trade when Greece, Spain 
and Portugal joined the EC.
28 Additionally, for the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden the 
study offers several product-specific examples of negative export effects on Argentina and Brazil. 
The conclusion is that the imminent enlargement of the EU to the CEECs is also likely to have 
additional trade diversion effects, to the detriment of the Mercosur countries. 
 
 
Greece, Spain and Portugal 
Goto [1996] analyzed the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to determine whether patterns 
of agricultural and manufactures trade flows changed after enlargement. He found that in all three 
cases there was a significant increase in regional agricultural trade but at best minor changes in 
the patterns of trade in manufactures, and concluded that these differences should be attributed to 
____________ 
28  Apparently, there is no analysis of the possible trade diversion effects on agricultural trade of the first EC enlargement, 
but some researchers have found overall trade diversion effects when Denmark, Ireland and the UK acceded (see, for 
example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1997]). 28 
the EU’s structure of protection, which is heavily biased towards agriculture. The main findings 
are shown in Table IV.1 In the case of Greece, for example, the EC-9 share of agricultural imports 
from Greece in total agricultural imports increased from 0.627% before enlargement to 1% after the 
country’s accession. On the other hand, the EC-9 share of Greece’s agricultural imports increased 
very steeply, from 28% before enlargement to 64% afterwards. The same effects are evident when 
Portugal and Spain joined the EC.
29 The share of these countries’ imports from the EC-10, for 




AGRICULTURAL TRADE SHARES BEFORE AND AFTER SUCCESSIVE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU 
Bilateral Import Shares (%) (1) 
EC  Acceding Countries  Joining Country 
B  A  D (4)  B  A  D (4) 
   
Greece  (2)  0.627 1.000 0.373 28.020  63.500  35.480 
Spain and Portugal (3)  2.730  3.513  0.783  16.872  27.568  10.670 
   
Notes:  (1) B, A, and D stand for: before, after and difference. 
  (2) Average share before and after a are for the years 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. 
  (3) Average share before and after are for 1976-1985 and 1986-1995 respectively. 
  (4) Difference between before and after. 
Source: Goto [1997]. 
 
 
Note that the increased import shares in the new EC members were not concentrated in a few 
products but extended over many agricultural sectors. Who lost agricultural market shares in the 
EC and in the three acceding countries? The answer is that nearly all other geographical regions 
lost shares in both groups of countries, including NAFTA and Latin America (Goto [1997]). 
 
To offer additional insights into the effects of enlargement on Mercosur’s trade, Table IV.2 shows 
EU agricultural imports from Argentina, Portugal and Spain for 1990 and 2000, by chapter of 
the HS.
30 Although these years post-date the enlargement, researchers have found that regional 
agreements have anticipatory effects, and also that their trade effects extend many years after the 
agreement has been signed. According to one estimate, the latter effect lasts on average for 12 
years (Freund and McLaren [1999]).
31 In line with these findings, it is unsurprising to note in 
Table IV.2 that Argentina continued to lose share in EU agricultural imports, while Portugal and 
Spain continued to gain.
32 What happened to Argentina is all the more alarming in a decade when 
its agricultural output grew rapidly and when agricultural exports doubled. 
____________ 
29  Goto [1997] also tests for differences in average imports shares and finds that those reported in Table IV.1 for 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
30  Ideally the analysis should also cover the years before enlargement, but the author lacked access to the statistics 
covering this period. 
31  This happens because investment decisions react with a time lag relative to the creation of new trade incentives. 
32  Obviously, Argentina’s loss can also be attributed to other factors associated with EU policies, including: (i) more 
recent enlargements as discussed below, including their anticipatory effects; and (ii) continued EU deepening, leading 
to the introduction of the single currency. Part of this could also be related to the trade creation effects of Mercosur. 
On the basis of previous findings, however, the direct effects of enlargement seem to be the main reason. 29 
TABLE IV.2 
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS INTO THE EU FROM ARGENTINA. PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 
(US$ MILLIONS) AND SHARES IN TOTAL EU AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 1990 AND 2000 
       Shares in Total EU Agric. Imp. 
Argentina  Portugal  Spain  Argentina  Spain and Portugal 
Chapter 
1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
            
1  5.4  5.0  16.2  18.6  36.5  261.3 0.6% 0.4% 4.9%  24.3% 
2 445.3  337.5  1.9 10.1  261.0  945.7  16.2%  8.5%  7.9%  24.2% 
3  195.7 428.8 150.5 180.8 361.8 820.4  3.2%  4.1%  7.0%  9.5% 
4  17.6 43.4 43.5  144.0  143.3  419.4  1.7%  2.5%  14.5%  33.1% 
5  27.2 16.1 20.4 23.9 33.9 52.5  3.6%  1.6%  5.9%  7.6% 
6  0.1 1.0 3.9  15.4  79.4  162.8  0.0%  0.1%  11.2%  12.8% 
7  77.5 74.4 24.9 56.0  1,056.0  2625.9  2.2%  1.4%  25.1%  49.8% 
8 220.2  260.2 31.7 59.8  2,211.5  2884.2  2.8%  2.4%  23.4%  26.7% 
9  11.1  5.5  6.9  17.9  41.5  67.0 0.3% 0.1% 1.1% 1.5% 
10  73.2  278.1  10.6  21.7  219.4  208.3  5.2% 14.6% 13.5% 12.1% 
11  0.0 0.4 0.2 5.1  10.1  53.3  0.0%  0.3%  10.4%  43.3% 
12 598.8  246.6  5.9  20.1  91.3  79.1  14.1% 4.4% 1.9% 1.8% 
13  0.1 0.0 7.7 7.6  34.4  53.5  0.0%  0.0%  12.4%  11.6% 
14  0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 3.2 4.5  0.1%  0.2%  2.0%  3.4% 
15  115.3 76.1 23.7 30.8  628.6  683.2  4.9%  2.5%  22.9%  23.2% 
16  121.9 59.6 86.7 64.4 79.6  345.1  6.2%  1.9%  6.9%  12.8% 
17  2.9  3.3  2.5  28.9  46.5  224.2 0.2% 0.2% 3.0%  15.3% 
18  0.1  2.7  0.5  3.6  34.6  113.1 0.0% 0.1% 1.8% 5.8% 
19  0.1  3.4  2.9  38.3  34.1  272.9 0.0% 0.4% 8.7%  35.7% 
20  37.7 23.8 41.3  104.4  490.2  639.5  1.4%  0.6%  16.4%  18.0% 
21  0.6 0.3 7.7  47.1  70.2  257.3  0.1%  0.0%  12.8%  20.8% 
22  11.1  72.3 342.2 340.0 553.2  1161.2  0.7%  1.6%  48.1%  32.5% 
23  718.4  1,629.2 19.8 11.7 42.1  132.7  15.0%  29.2%  1.1%  2.6% 
24  51.9  56.6  2.7  32.7  4.6  111.9 2.5% 2.1% 0.3% 5.3% 
Total  2,732.3  3,624.7  854.5  1,283.1  6,566.9  12,579.1  5.2%  4.6%  11.6%  17.5% 
        
Source: Eurostat (names of chapters in Appendix Table A.1). 
 
 
Austria, Finland and Sweden 
These countries became members of the EU in January 1995. Table IV.3 shows the growth rates 
of their imports from the EU and from Argentina before and after enlargement. The figures reveal 
striking differences in all cases, with significantly lower rates for imports from Argentina relative 
to those from the EU. The extreme case is Finland, where agricultural imports from the EU grew 
by 147% while its purchases from Argentina declined by 41%. 
 
Table IV.4 show variations in EU agricultural import shares from Argentina and Brazil before and 
after the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The decline in Argentina’s share was more 
than double that for Brazil, but several product-specific examples illustrate substantial losses for 
both countries. 30 
TABLE IV.3 
IMPORT GROWTH RATES BETWEEN 1990 AND 2000 BY 
AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND FROM ARGENTINA AND THE EU (%) 
  Supplier 
Importing Country  EU  Argentina 
    
Austria 106  25 
Sweden 69  3 
Finland 147  -41 





EU AGRICULTURAL IMPORT SHARE FROM ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (1) 
Argentina  Brazil  Total 
Joining Country 
B  A  D (2)  B   A  D (2)  B   A  D (2) 
                
Austria, Finland and Sweden  0.01890  0.01610  -14.8% 0.02913  0.02739  -6.0%  0.04803  0.04351  -9.4% 
                
Notes:  (1) The average before and after the enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden are for 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 respectively. 
 (2)  D=  (A-B)/B 
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Eurostat and UN statistics. 
 
To begin with Argentina, Table IV.5 shows that Sweden’s imports of apples from Argentina fell 
by 67% between 1991 and 2000 while imports from the EU increased more than eleven times. 
The second example shows that Austria’s imports of tobacco from Argentina has disappeared in 
recent years while imports from the EU simultaneously grew strongly. The example of apples is 
particularly interesting, since it illustrates the trade losses for non-members of EU enlargement 




SWEDEN'S IMPORTS OF APPLES AND AUSTRIA'S IMPORTS OF TOBACCO 
FROM ARGENTINA AND THE EU, 1991-2000 
Apples (US$ millions)  Tobacco (US$ thousands) 
Year 
Argentina  EU  Total  Argentina  EU  Total 
          
1991 10.1  3.6 46.3  1,670  5,833  25,869 
1992 14.5  1.9 56.2  332  1,922  17,931 
1993 5.1 0.0  50.9  437  2,648  18,926 
1994 2.8 0.0  46.9  171  2,455  20,326 
1995  5.3 23.5 63.5  0  3,489  24,615 
1996  3.9 29.8 72.6  0  4,423  17,858 
1997  3.8 38.4 66.2  0  7,030  20,532 
1998  3.0 37.7 60.7  254  6,917  22,182 
1999  2.9 34.6 55.7  0  7,443  24,600 
2000  2.1 40.9 50.1  0  9,202  45,659 
           
Source: Eurostat. 
____________ 
33  Protection of fruits in the EU is granted mainly through specific tariffs that vary by time of year and import price; the 
closer to harvest time and the lower the import price, the higher the equivalent ad valorem tariffs. This means that 
fruits and vegetables in the EU are protected by dozens of equivalent ad valorem tariffs (WTO [1999]). 31 
For a sample of cases, Figures IV.1, IV.2 and IV.3 reveal clear negative effects on Brazil’s exports 
following these countries’ accession. The first two examples illustrate dramatic substitution effects 
away from Brazil and towards the EU in the case of Finnish and Swedish imports of horse meat. 
In 1990, for example, 80% of Finland’s imports came from Brazil, but by 2000 the share had 
declined to just 7%. In the same period, the corresponding share of the EU rose from 15% to 
79%. In the case of Sweden’s imports of frozen orange juice, Brazil’s share was 42% in 1990 but 













































































Source: Appendix Table A.4. 
 
 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
The next step in the enlargement of the EU includes most of the following countries: Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia. What effects will this enlargement have on Mercosur’s exports? Some findings 
have been advanced but the question merits further analysis since the existing evidence is mixed. 
One study concludes that this enlargement will have minor negative effects on Latin America 
because, in most of the region’s exports to the EU that overlap with those from the CEECs, Latin 
America has comparative advantage. More specifically: "for 78% of Latin American agricultural 
exports to the EU, there is no competitive threat from the CEEC countries" (IRELA [1997]). The 
same study found that in 42 products both regions have revealed comparative advantage. Some of 
these products include poultry meat, live plants, some vegetables, some fruits and fruit juices, 
sunflower oil, and malt beer. Because these products are not significant exports from the CEECs, 




There are two reasons to suggest that, at least for some products, this conclusion might be erroneous. 
First, to a far greater extent than Western Europe, these are agricultural countries that are undergoing 
major economic transformations from planned to market-based economies. In these circumstances 
it is risky to predict -on the basis that the CEECs did not have comparative advantage in the 
1990s- that this situation will continue to prevail in the future. The experience of the Mercosur 
countries in the 1990s, which was one of rapidly expanding agricultural output and trade following 
structural reforms, suggests that the same could happen in the CEECs. 
____________ 
34  This conclusion contrasts with studies carried out on other countries. The study by Leetma, et al. [1998] on the 











Second, one methodological problem with the IRELA study is that it does not account for the shift 
in the structure of relative prices that will occur when the new countries adopt the EU’s common 
external tariff for manufactured products, and the CAP for agricultural goods. Traditionally, the 
CEECs have provided high protection to manufacturing, and thus their accession to the EU will 
entail a significant improvement in the relative domestic price of agricultural products, which 
in turn should give rise to an expansion of agricultural output. This relative price shift will be 
particularly pronounced in view of the fact that these countries will also be adopting the CAP’s 
protectionist agricultural prices. According to one study, in fact, adoption of CAP prices means 
that for many products the CEECs will become competitive agricultural producers. 
 
Table IV.6 present estimates of domestic resource costs for a group of goods produced by Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary,
35 using EU prices as shadow prices. These estimates confirm 
that Bulgaria and the Czech Republic enjoy comparative advantage in several agricultural products. 
The picture is less clear for Hungary, but for this country the authors of the study note that if 
"direct payments were available" (so if not only price alignment but also policy harmonization 
between the CEECs and the EU is assumed), then the lack of private profitability reported for 
Hungarian sunflower, wheat and barley production in 1996 would had been reversed (Gorton and 




DRCS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN BULGARIA, 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY, 1996 
Commodity  Bulgaria  Czech Republic  Hungary 
     
Wheat 0.25  0.66  1.06 
Maize n.a.  n.a.  0.69 
Barley 0.39  0.68  1.16 
Sunflower n.a.  n.a.  1.73 
Milk 0.89  0.87  1.07 
Beef 0.34  1.18  1.50 
Pork 0.64  n.a.  0.94 
     
Source: Gorton and Davidova [(2001) Table 4]. 
 
 
These estimates, coupled to previous experiences with EU enlargements as discussed above, suggest 
that Latin America’s agricultural exports, particularly those of Mercosur, will suffer another blow 
from the accession of the CEECs. How soon this damage will be apparent depends on how fast 
these countries advance with their structural transformation towards market-based economies. 
Given that this process will probably be hastened by their new status as EU members, the damage 
is likely to occur sooner rather than later. In any case, further research is needed to offer new 
insights into how the accession of the CEECs will affect Latin America. 
 
____________ 
35  The domestic resource cost indicator is estimated as the ratio of the resource costs of productive factors, 
measured at shadow prices, to the value-added estimated at border prices (Gorton and Davidova [2001]). 34 
In sum, given the EU’s irrationally high levels of agricultural protectionism, each of its enlargements 
has had substantial trade diversion effects and future enlargements will be no exception. Non-
members have lost significant export opportunities in the process, and in such cases, Mercosur 




NAFTA came into effect in January 1994, a date that provides the pivot for analysis of trade 
diversion effects before and after. The focus here is on what happened to Argentine and Brazilian 
exports to Mexico, which is generally acknowledged to be an uncompetitive agricultural producer. 
In the case of Argentina, the first thing to note is that between 1990 and 2001 Mexico’s agricultural 
imports from the country declined by 36.7%, while its purchases from Canada and the United 
States increased by 216.2% and 169.7% respectively. These substantial differences suggest trade 
diversions effects. 
 
The timeframe of the combined effects on Argentina and Brazil is presented in Table IV.7, whose 
figures confirm these countries’ clear loss of market share and the gains for Canada and the 
United States. Table IV.8 presents more disaggregated figures, revealing changes in market shares 
at the chapter level of the HS. For Argentina and Brazil, the figures indicate substantial losses in 





SHARE OF ARGENTINA PLUS BRAZIL AND US PLUS CANADA 
IN MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FOR 1988-2001 
(Percentages) 
Year  Argentina + Brazil  US + Canada 
     
1990 5.3 64.8 
1991 1.5 78.3 
1992 1.1 78.0 
1993 1.7 77.8 
1994 4.0 76.9 
1995 2.8 80.7 
1996 3.0 81.4 
1997 2.2 79.8 
1998 2.4 82.7 
1999 1.6 81.6 
2000 1.8 80.7 




One case of loss to Mercosur from the creation of NAFTA is that of sunflower oil exports from 
Argentina to Mexico. Table IV.9 shows Mexico’s imports from Argentina and the United States for 
the period 1991-2000. By 1995, rapidly increasing imports from Argentina came to an end and 35 
thereafter declined rapidly, from US$82.4 million to just US$3.6 million in 2000. The figures also 




SHARE IN MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS OF ARGENTINA 
PLUS BRAZIL AND CANADA PLUS US 
(Percentages) 
Argentina and Brazil  Canada and US 
Chapter 
1990  2000  1990  2000 
        
1 0.0  0.0  97  83.7 
2 0.0  0.0  89  93.8 
3 0.4  4.5  47  35.5 
4 0.0  3.6  23  36.7 
5 0.0  0.1  95  87.8 
6 0.0  0.5  50  74.7 
7 19.3  0.2 63  91.5 
8 2.5  0.9  74  74.5 
9 8.8  10.3  20  20.5 
10 0.0  0.0  98  99.4 
11 0.4  0.1  83  88.7 
12 5.8  3.4  80  88.0 
13 0.6  0.7  67  43.5 
14 0.0  0.0  66  5.0 
15 10.0  1.4  69  72.4 
16 4.0  0.5  65  86.4 
17 15.3  0.8  29  86.2 
18 3.1  11.7  86  61.4 
19 0.5  4.1  82  48.5 
20 14.9  0.6  68  74.0 
21 0.3  0.7  82  89.5 
22 2.8  3.6  28  47.3 
23 1.2  0.8  86  89.0 
24 23.9  57.2  35  12.9 
Total  5.3  1.8  64.8  80.7 





IMPORTS OF SUNFLOWER OIL BY MEXICO 
(US$ millions) 
Year  Argentina  US  Total 
     
1991 13.0 42.6 55.6 
1992  9.0 58.7 67.7 
1993 27.5 69.9 97.4 
1994 78.2 55.5  133.7 
1995 82.4 98.6  181.0 
1996 80.0 59.4  139.5 
1997 48.4 73.5  121.9 
1998 13.9 97.4  111.3 
1999 6.8  98.3  105.2 
2000  3.6 78.9 82.6 
     
Source: IDB-INTAL. 36 
Mexico’s entry into NAFTA was accompanied by a regional discussion of how the country should 
provide compensation in line with Article 44 of the Montevideo Treaty, which establishes that trade 
preferences given by any signatory to other countries should be extended on an "unconditional" 
basis to all the other signatories.
36 This discussion ended with the 1994 signing of the Protocolo 
Interpretativo del Artículo 44 del Tratado de Montevideo 1980. Argentina and Mexico negotiated 
compensation for the loss of sunflower oil exports, which took the form of a country-specific 




In short, NAFTA has had trade diversion effects against the Mercosur countries. These negative 
effects are likely to worsen in the next few years because sensitive agricultural products have been 
given long phasing-in periods for the attainment of regional free trade. One important example is 
maize, which Mexico has protected for decades and is soon to be liberalized under NAFTA (Cerro 
and Velez [2000]). When this happens, Canada and the United States will export more maize but 
the Mercosur countries most probably will not. Another source of trade diversion against Mercosur 
comes from the new trade agreements such as the FTA recently signed between Central America 
and the US. 
 
 
C. Other  Examples 
Even small integration agreements have also damaged Mercosur exports. Gupta and Schiff [1997] 
examined how Argentine exports declined as a consequence of the formation of the Andean Pact 
(AP). When the latter group was created in 1969, the member countries included Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela joined in 1973 and Chile withdrew in 1976. As was the 
case with several other Latin American integration schemes, in its early years the AP was very 
protectionist (Nogués and Quintanilla [1993]). More recently, however, the member countries 
have implemented significant liberalization policies and are now in the process of applying a 
common external tariff with reduced levels of protection (Devlin and Esteveadeordal [2001]). For 
a relatively large number of agricultural products, however, protection remains very high and is 
effected mainly through a system of price bands.
38 This high protection has probably spurred 
trade diversion and is therefore a matter of concern for the Mercosur countries. 
 
Gupta and Schiff ([1997] p. 7) analyzed the effects on Argentina’s cattle exports to Peru in the 
early years of the AP; Table IV.10 summarizes their findings. In the few years following the creation 
of the AP, Argentine cattle sales to Peru declined dramatically, being displaced by sales from 
Colombia. The authors also document price falls: "In terms of unit export values, Argentina obtained 
____________ 
36  Article 44 of the Montevideo Treaty states: "Las ventajas, favores, franquicias, inmunidades y privilegios que los 
países miembros apliquen a productos originarios de o destinados a cualquier otro país miembro o no miembro, por 
decisiones o acuerdos que no estén previstos en el presente Tratado o en el Acuerdo de Cartagena, serán inmediata 
e incondicionalmente extendidos a los restantes países miembros". 
37  The reason lies in the fact that Mexico retained the administration of the quota. 
38  An idea of just how protectionist these price bands are, can be assessed from the 1995  accession of Ecuador to 
the WTO when the following maximum ad valorem equivalents were notified and bound: poultry meat, 85%; skim milk 
powder, 72%; wheat, 45%; sugar, 45% (Ecuador [1995]). 37 
a higher unit value on exports to Peru than on its total cattle exports, though the premium on its 




CATTLE EXPORTS OF ARGENTINA AND COLOMBIA 
(US$ millions) 
Argentina  Colombia 
Period 
World  Peru  Other LAC ROW  World  Peru  Other LAC  ROW 
          
66-68  31.90  10.40  21.20 0.30  3.05 2.40 0.20 0.50 
70-72  16.70 0.40  16.20 0.06  15.80  13.00 0.60 2.20 
%  Change  -48%  -96%  -23%  -79%  417% 444% 302% 328% 
          




Since the signing of the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, Mercosur has reached associate membership 
agreements with Bolivia, Chile and Peru. In the meantime, many other countries have continued 
to conclude new agreements and/or expand others. This section’s main finding is that as a result 
of many if not all of these new RTAs the Mercosur countries are losing agricultural exports. 
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V.  LOSING EXPORTS TO PREFERENTIAL AND UNILATERAL POLICIES 
Strictly speaking, preferential programs are not on the negotiating table but, as discussed below, 
they do have negative effects on efficient agricultural producers. On the other hand, unilateral 
reforms such as those implemented by means of the US Farm Bill and the EU’s decoupling program 
are implemented under the rules of the URAA. Other unilateral policies such as the EU import ban 
on genetically modified organisms can also be included under unilateral policies having serious 
negative effects on Mercosur’s exports. Nevertheless, here I only address the US Farm Bill as an 
example of unilateral policies. 
 
 
A. The  GSP 
Table V.1 illustrates how important developing country markets are for Argentina’s exports, 
corroborating for all trade what was said in Section II. Policies like the GSP are likely to hurt 
middle-income countries in two ways. First, by granting trade preferences to some developing 
countries and not others, industrial countries’ unilateral preferential arrangements divert imports 
from more efficient to less efficient producers. Furthermore, recent research indicates that 
preferences lessen the incentives to undertake unilateral reforms; countries that receive the most 
benefits from GSP are precisely those that have the lowest trade to output ratios (Olarreaga and 
Ozden [2003]). Although the numbers are not large, unilateral preferences are more likely to 




ARGENTINA MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 1990-2001 
(US$ millions) 
Destination  1990  1995  2001  Variation (%) 
1990-2001 
      
World 12,353  20,363  28,646  131.9 
Industrial Countries  6,144  6,632  8,375  36.3 
Developing Countries  6,043  13,660  19,807  227.8 
      
Source: Bannister [2002]. 
 
 
The oldest of such schemes is the GSP, and the following now provide unilateral benefits: Australia, 
Belarus, Canada, the Czech Republic, the EU, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Russia, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the United States. Since these are unilateral 
preferences, the countries offering them decide on the rules that guide their allocation. Because 
each country sets its own rules, which change from time to time, for recipient countries the 
stability of the benefits is not assured.
39 This is one reason why the actual use of preferences 
remains well below potential use (see, for example, Mattoo and Subramanian [2002]). 
 
____________ 
39  In addition to rules on eligibility and graduation, there is also discretion in setting the preference margins and the 
rules of origin, all of which diminishes the value of the preferences. 40 
In 1999 the Quad countries’ GSP imports were: Canada, US$4.16 billion (2% of the total); the 
EU, US$38.2 billion (5%); Japan, US$39.9 billion (15%); and the United States, US$16.7 billion 
(2%). Table V.2 simulates the welfare or income effects of removing GSP benefits. In relative 
terms these are small numbers, reflecting the unimportance of unilateral preferences. It is 
particularly interesting to note that, among beneficiary regions, Latin America is the one that 
would lose least with the removal of GSP, which indicates that the region has not gained 
significant unilateral benefits. The beneficiaries with the highest income gains from unilateral 




WELFARE EFFECTS OF REMOVING GSP PREFERENCES 
Region  Total  Change 
    
Asian NICs  -2,317  -0,230 
China -1,855  -0,150 
South Asia  -964  -0,190 
Western Europe  3,719  0,050 
North America  2,252  0,020 
Transition Economies  -1,297  -0,170 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -701  -0,220 
Oceania -11  -0,003 
North Africa and Middle East  -1,816  -0,230 
Latin America  -1,043  -0,050 
Japan 1,189  0,033 
ROW -446  -0,170 
Total  -3,293  n.a. 
    
Source: Laird and Safadi [2002]. 
 
 
B.  Other Preferential Programs 
The net effects of the GSP and other similar schemes on Latin America’s agricultural exports, and 
particularly those of the Mercosur countries, is unclear. These countries receive GSP benefits but 
their exports are diverted by the preferences given to non-member countries, and therefore the net 
effects remain to be studied. Nevertheless, the recent trend among industrial countries of focusing 
their preferences on least developed countries (LDCs) makes it increasingly likely that their net 
effects for Mercosur will be negative. Four considerations support this premise. First, unlike the 
old GSP scheme, which excluded many sensitive items (such as several agricultural products), new 
schemes such as the EU’s "Everything But Arms", and the United States’ African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) are very comprehensive. Second, unlike the old schemes, the new ones 
have longer time-spans that stabilize rules and thereby reinforce the incentives for recipient countries 
to invest in specializing their production patterns. Third, because Latin American countries, 
including the Mercosur members, are generally middle-income, they are not eligible for preferences 
under the new schemes. Finally, to the extent that agriculture remains highly protected and the 
Doha Round negotiations fail to produce a far-reaching liberalization of agricultural protectionism 
in the countries granting the preferences, the trade diversion effects will become increasingly 
serious (see Section VI). As explained below, protecting the preferences from erosion in a new 41 
multilateral agreement is another way in which some countries are proposing to retain protectionism 
with negative trade diversion effects against Mercosur. 
 
 
C.  The US Farm Bill
 40 
With the passage of the Farm Bill (the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002), there is a 
strong sense that the United States is engaging in double-talk. In its international policy discourse, 
the country shows clear signs of seeking agricultural liberalization -in the FTAA talks, for example, 
and in the Doha negotiations, where it has tabled a very ambitious proposal-. Domestically, however, 
the United States takes the opposite path. Congressional approval of the Farm Bill indicates that 
the US government has bowed to the demands of its concentrated and powerful agricultural lobby 
(more than 80% of the total assistance provided to agriculture by the US Government, is allocated 
to the top 25% of farms classified by size). The bill not only locks in high levels of agricultural 
support but also increases them by around 21% (World Bank and IMF [2002]). Although most of 
the assistance will go to cereal producers, several other products (such as honey) have been added 




Program for Basic Products 
The main elements of the program for basic products include direct and counter-cyclical payments. 
The following products have traditionally been considered basic in farm bills: wheat, maize, 
barley, sorghum, oat, cotton and rice. The 2002 Farm Bill makes two changes to the program of 
direct payments. First, it adds the following products: soya, peanuts and other oilseeds. Second, 
the old Farm Bill set limits on the maximum annual payments, while the new one does not. It is 




Counter-cyclical payments aim to ensure minimum prices to agricultural producers. Hence these 




Conservation programs are another way of providing subsidies to agricultural production. These 
programs provide around US$17.1 billion to farmers working the land subject to conservation 
funds. The new Farm Bill includes new conservation programs, and increases the acreage that is 
eligible for receiving benefits. 
____________ 
40  A comprehensive analysis of unilateral changes to agricultural subsidy policies should also include a discussion of 
the recent reforms of EU subsidies, as well as the entrenched programs being implemented in Japan. The Farm Bill is 
singled out because in terms of magnitude it seems to be the most important. 
41  Unless otherwise stated, the other comments on the Farm Bill are taken from Basco, et al. [2002]. 
42  Gardner [2002] estimates that the excess production of payments to basic products could reduce international 
cereal prices by 8%. 42 
Export Promotion 
The new Farm Bill extends the program of credit guarantees until 2007 and adds some new 
elements. First, it establishes a program of consultations with the Senate and the House on the 
negotiations on credit guarantees at the WTO. Such a political mechanism lessens the likelihood 





In addition to traditional product-specific programs for dairy goods, peanuts and sugar, there are 
new programs for wool, honey, garbanzo and lentils. The new Farm Bill also includes funds for 
apple and vegetable producers. 
 
In sum, in addition to the very negative signals sent by the bill, some analysts challenge the US 
position that the additional assistance is decoupled. They conclude that the extra aid will increase 
production by 4% and further lower international agricultural prices (World Bank and IMF [2002]; 





The Farm Bill is bad news for Latin America, and industrial countries’ new preference schemes 
could also hurt exports from efficient middle-income agricultural producers. As indicated below, 
the Farm Bill is contrary to the positions tabled by the United States in the Doha Round. So could 
the "real United States please stand up"? For now the conclusion must be that the Congress is 
protectionist while the administration has taken a more liberalizing stance. Where, then, is the 
United States heading? There is both a pessimistic and an optimistic view. The pessimism stems 
from the fact that the Farm Bill was quite easily passed, being approved in the House by 280 to 
141 votes, and in the Senate by 64 to 35. If this situation prevailed in 2002, why should it be 
different in a few years time? One possible optimistic view is that this strong protectionist bent 
can be modified if the outcome of the Doha Round and/or the FTAA involves export gains that 
are significant enough to counteract current protectionist agricultural lobbies in Congress. 
 
Preference policies are a different matter. Traditionally, programs like the GSP have been 
unsuccessful in providing a significant boost to most countries that are subject to them. In part, 
this is because of convoluted administrative procedures involved in acquiring the right to export at 
reduced duties. Nevertheless, many developing countries’ failure to increasing exports rapidly is 
also a result of their own policies. Trends in preference policies suggest that such policies will pay 
little if any attention to the importance of sound economic policies. Instead, the evidence indicates 
that poverty is the main criterion for deciding which countries do and do not have the right to a 
____________ 
43  The "…most compelling reason to consider the countercyclical payments as well as the direct payments not to be 
decoupled, is the fact that program bases are regularly adjusted, or updated in farm bills. The history has been that in 
every US farm bill, farmers can reasonably expect their bases to be adjusted. If they expect that their future program 
benefits will increase through them planting more (…) they will produce more" (Freeman [2002]). 43 
tariff preference; a country can be granted preferences if it is poor. The above discussion offered a 
number of reasons why, in contrast to past experience, the new preference policies are more likely 
to induce investment, thereby threatening to displace middle-income developing countries’ exports. 
This undermines the incentives for domestic reform which in turn adds another negative effect on 
Mercosur export prospects. The new preference schemes’ goal of reducing poverty is so strong 
that some proposals tabled at the Doha Round call for a slower reduction of most favored nation 
(MFN) agricultural tariffs, so as to preserve preference margins for a longer period. If such proposals 
are implemented, multilateral liberalization will have been subordinated to unilateral policies. In 
the process, efficient agricultural developing countries will suffer twice: first from reduced market 
access to industrial countries, and second from the slower growth in developing countries that is 
attendant on probable delays in implementing economic transformation policies. 
  
 45 
VI. ASSESSING  THE  PROSPECTS  OF ALTERNATIVE EXTERNAL TRADE 
STRATEGIES 
There is no doubt that the greatest gain that efficient agricultural exporters could attain would be 
in a far-reaching multilateral liberalization agreement. Some orders of magnitude for Argentina 
are presented in Table VI.1 The underlying exercise, based on a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, compares the export gains of alternative liberalization programs, including: (i) the 
FTAA; (ii) a free trade agreement with NAFTA (FTNF); (iii) a free trade agreement with the EU 
(FTEU); and (iv) a multilateral free trade agreement. The numbers indicate that the FTAA has 
approximately the same effect on Argentina’s exports as a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
NAFTA countries. The impact of these agreements, moreover, is about one third that of an FTA 




EFFECTS ON ARGENTINA’S EXPORTS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Change from base (US$ millions) 
  FTAA  NAFTA  EU  Global 
      
Brazil -3,400  800  -1,700  -5,600 
NAFTA 2,400  2,800  -800  900 
Rest of LA  4,800  500  -1,200  2,800 
EU 900  600  23,200  10,200 
ROW  1,400 1,000 3,000 9,700 
Total  6,200  5,800  16,300  18,000 
      
Source: van der Mensbrugghe [2002], 
 
 
A recent study of Brazil concludes that the best FTA would be a Mercosur-EU accord, but only on 
condition that there is free trade in agricultural products. In this regard the authors conclude that 
if "the EU excludes its highly protected agricultural products from the EU-Mercosur agreement, 
the gains to Brazil are reduced to only one ninth of the value of the gains with full preferential 
market access to the EU. If the United States employs antidumping to exclude market access to 
Brazil for most protected products in the United States, the gains to Brazil would be reduced to two 
thirds of the gains Brazil would obtain from full market access in the FTAA. If both agreements 
are implemented with excluded products, the FTAA will be more valuable to Brazil than the 
agreement with the EU" (Harrison, et al. [2002] p. 3). 
 
In sum, and unsurprisingly, the picture to emerge indicates that agricultural liberalization in the 
FTAA would provide gains for most members, but that for some of the most efficient producers, 
like Argentina, such gains are only a fraction of those to be made in an FTA with the EU or an 
ambitious liberalization process in the Doha Round. As discussed below, however, unlike trade 
liberalization in the Western Hemisphere, which is an achievable proposition, neither the EU nor 
the global trade talks currently seem likely to lead to significant liberalization.
44 
____________ 
44  The FTAA will also diversify market destinations, which should help reduce Latin American countries’ external 
vulnerability. 46 
The discussion below assesses the prospects of multilateralism, regionalism and unilateralism. 
 
 
A.  Preliminary Assessment of the Doha Negotiations 
The following discussion divides the Doha agricultural negotiations into two parts. It first 
concentrates on the proposals initially tabled by the Cairns Group (CG), the United States and the 
EU, and also includes the middle-of-the-road proposal put forward by Stuart Harbinson, then 
Chairman of the WTO Agricultural Committee. The discussion offers grounds for assessing the 
tensions that arose as the Cancún Ministerial Meeting approached. After that there is a brief 
discussion of the events leading up to the outcome of the Cancún meeting. 
 
 
The Initial Stage 
Although the various proposals tabled during the initial stage of the Doha negotiations have by 
now been superseded by recent events, it is nevertheless interesting to discuss them briefly in 
order to assess the extent to which the different positions have been changing. There follows a 
discussion of market access, export subsidies, and domestic assistance. 
 
 
- Market Access - 
Table VI.2 compares the CG, US and EU proposals on market access.
45 As is evident, the CG 
proposal was less ambitious on tariff reduction but it sought a wider expansion of the quota 
segments of the tariff quotas. Furthermore, it is clear that the CG proposal reflected a preoccupation 
with the importance of transforming non ad valorem tariffs (a central element of the proposal), 
while the United States proposal eschewed this point. 
 
The EU proposal repeated the UR formula, namely an average tariff reduction of 36% with a 15% 
minimum reduction at the product level over six years. In line with the analysis in Section III, for 
many products with dirty tariffication a 36% reduction could lead to higher protection than that 
prevailing in the pre-UR years. Moreover, the proposal was silent on several other issues, including 
tariff peaks, specific tariffs, expansion of tariff quotas, and administration of quotas. 
 
This proposal offered no substantive increase in market access, at least for the exports of middle-
income countries such as the Mercosur members. Under the proposal, 50% of developed countries’ 
agricultural imports from developing countries, and 100% of those from least developed countries, 
would enter duty-free (no tariffs or quotas). The impact of the former proposal has to be analyzed 
carefully but it seems unlikely that it adds much to existing market access conditions. The reason, 
as Section II shows, is that Mercosur’s export potential is concentrated in a group of products that 
most probably will not be liberalized. The discussion in Section IV indicates that the EU’s division 
of the developing world into LDCs and others is most likely to harm middle-income countries’ 
export opportunities. 
____________ 
45  Information provided by a trade negotiator indicates that Canada, probably the most protectionist country in the 
CG, did not endorsed the proposal on market access. 47 
TABLE VI.2 
DOHA ROUND PROPOSALS ON MARKET ACCESS 
Compromises  Cairns Group  US  EU 
       
Tariff Reduction  DC: Swiss formula. First year 
down payment of 50% of total 
reduction. 
DVC: Reductions depending on 
the initial level of tariff. 
Swiss formula with maximum of 
25%. 
Average reduction of 365 and 
minimum reduction of 15%. 
       
       
Time Frame  DC: 5 years and  
DVC: 9 years. 
5 years  DC: 6 years 
DVC: 10 years 
       
       
Base  UR bound tariffs  Applied tariff in January 2000  UR bound tariffs 
       
       
Minimum Access  DC: Increase to 20% of 
domestic consumption in 5 
years. First year down payment 
of 50%. 
DVC: Expansion to 14% of 
domestic consumption in 9 
years. 
Increase by 20%. Part of this 
increase is to be allocated to 
non- traditional suppliers. 
Silent 
       
       
In-Quota Tariff  DC: Elimination 
DVC: Reduction 
Linear elimination in 5 years.  Silent 
       
       
Non Ad Valorem Tariff  Transform to ad valorem tariff 
with specific rules. 
Does not specify methodology  Silent 
       
       
Special Safeguards  DC: Elimination 
DVC: New mechanism to be 
negotiated. 
Elimination Maintain 
       
Source: Argentina’s Secretariat of Agriculture. 
 
 
- Export Subsidies - 
As Table VI.3 shows, the EU proposed reducing export subsidies by only 45%,
46 while the CG and 
the United States proposed their elimination. The reduction was to be applied to the bound values, 
not the applied values. Since for most countries the latter are well below the former, in most cases 
the reduction would have had no effect in reducing protection. Additionally, the proposal set no 
product-specific limits, and thus there was no assurance that international dumping would decline. 
This is obviously another significant issue for the Mercosur countries, which export products 




DOHA ROUND PROPOSALS ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Compromises  Cairns Group  US  EU 
       
Reduction Progressive  elimination Progressive  elimination Substantial  reduction 
       
       
Time Frame  DC: 3 Years 
DVC: 6 Years 
5 Years  DC: 6 Years DVC: 10 Years 
       
       
Peace Clause  Presupposes termination Silent  Continuation 
       
Source: Argentina’s Secretariat of Agriculture. 
____________ 
46  The proposal also states that on the condition that other subsidizing countries follow, the EU is prepared to eliminate 
export subsidies for wheat, oilseeds, olive oil and tobacco. In assessing this proposal it should be recalled that the 
volumes of these products exported by the EU are not significant. 48 
- Domestic Assistance - 
Table VI.4 reveals significant differences in the proposals to lessen the negative effects of domestic 
assistance policies. In particular, the EU proposal to reduce the value of the amber box by 55%, 
and to do nothing with regard to the blue box (which it uses heavily), was in sharp contrast to the 




DOHA ROUND PROPOSALS ON DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE 
Compromises  Cairns Group  US  EU 
       
Amber Box  Elimination  Reduction to a maximum of 5% 
of agricultural production 
Reduction by 55% 
       
       
Time Frame  DC: 5 Years 
DVC: 9 Years 
5 Years  DC: 6 Years 
DVC: 10 Years 
       
       
Reduction by Product  Yes  Silent   Silent 
       
       
Blue Box  Elimination  Add to amber  No modification 
       
       
Green Box  Revise and cap it  Maintain status quo  Expand to include programs 
such as animal welfare 
       
Source: Argentina’s Secretariat of Agriculture. 
 
 
- Harbinson Proposal - 
In an attempt to bridge the gap between the different proposals, and to help to meet the March 31, 
2003 deadline agreed for establishing the reform modalities for the agricultural negotiations, 
WTO Agricultural Committee Chairman Stuart Harbinson tabled an intermediate proposal. What 
follows is a summary of the proposals on market access, export subsidies, and domestic 




Tariffs. Tariff cuts to be made from bound levels, which are generally higher (and sometimes 
much higher) than applied tariffs. Except for the in-quota tariffs, the cuts are as follows: 
•  For tariffs higher than 90% the average reduction is 60%, with a minimum cut of 45% per 
tariff line. 
•  For tariffs below or equal to 90% the average reduction is 50%, with a minimum cut of 35%. 
•  For tariffs below or equal to 15% the average cut is 40%, with a minimum cut of 25%. 
 
Tariff-quotas. Final bound quotas that are less than 10% of the average consumption in 1999-2001 
period would be expanded by 10%. This was significantly lower than the CG proposal. 
 
Implementation period. Five years for industrial countries and ten years for developing countries. 49 
Special and differential treatment. Developing countries’ average tariff reduction and quota 
expansion are lower than the parameters proposed for industrial countries. For the highest tariffs, 
for example, the proposal includes an average reduction of 40% (instead of 60%), and a minimum 
cut of 30% (instead of 45%). 
 
Other elements. These include: (i) converting all non-ad valorem tariffs such as variable levies 
into ad valorem tariffs; (ii) improving the rules for the administration of the quota allocation 




Eliminate export subsidies: for 50% of products in five years and for the other 50% in ten years. 
The proposal also calls for limiting the terms and interest, so as to bring export credit closer to 
market conditions. Aid for food would be given in cash instead of in kind. Greater constraints 
would be imposed on state-trading enterprises in both industrial and developing countries, there 




On this issue, the Harbinson proposal included: (i) cap and bind blue box payments and reduce 
by 50% or include the blue box in aggregate measure of support (AMS) and reduce by 60%; (ii) 
reduce amber box by 60%; and (iii) reduce de minimis support. 
 
In sum, the initial proposals tabled by the CG and United States sought a far-reaching liberalization 
of agricultural trade, while that of the EU sought (at most) minimum reforms. Harbinson’s proposal 
was a middle-of-the-road attempt to steer the negotiations towards a successful outcome but, as 
indicated below, this also came to naught, mainly because the EU did not want to change its 
position. No such inflexibility was displayed by either the United States or the CG, but the history 
of recent decades suggests that on agricultural matters the EU has prevailed. 
 
 
The Cancún Meeting 
The Doha agricultural negotiations are again revealing the EU’s resistance (and that of Japan and 
South Korea) to significant liberalization of agricultural trade. A brief review of what happened in 
the final days before the Cancún Meeting illustrates how the different players acted. On August 13, 
less than a month before the meeting, the United States and the EU tabled a joint text (JT) at the 
Doha agricultural negotiations. The substance of the proposal indicates that the United States had 
abandoned its initially ambitious position and, although the JT on the three pillars of agricultural 
protectionism offers no specific numbers, it is clear that the United States has come much closer 
to the EU position than vice versa. Some of the weak points of the JT include: 
•  Average reduction of domestic support instead of a product-specific obligation. 
•  Unlike the CG proposal, the JT does not propose elimination of the amber box. 
•  The JT is silent on the blue box, in contrast to the CG proposal for its elimination. 
•  The JT says nothing about capping the green box and strengthening disciplines. 50 
•  The blended formula for improved market access leaves room for a great deal of negotiation 
that might eventually entail minimal liberalization. 
•  The special agricultural safeguard for industrial countries is to be negotiated instead of 
abolished. 
•  On special and differential treatment, the JT proposed establishing a special safeguard for 
developing countries. There is as yet practically no assessment of the likely costs and benefits, 
but under some scenarios this instrument could inflict serious damage on South-South trade. 
In contrast, the Harbinson proposal said that special safeguards would not be imposed on 
imports from other developing countries. 
•  The JT is silent on quota expansion and administration procedures. 
•  The JT is ambiguous on the extent to which export subsidies will be eliminated. This is 
inconsistent with the mandate of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
 
On August 20, a group of developing countries presented a counter-proposal to the EU-US joint 
text in an effort to redress several of its protectionist elements. Consequently, only few days before 
the Cancún meeting, there was a serious divergence in the positions of the different groups. On 
August 24, Carlos Perez del Castillo, Chairman of the WTO General Council, released a draft 
ministerial proposal that was opposed by the G-20, a group formed to strengthen negotiating 
capacities at the Cancún meeting. In addition to most of the Cairns Group countries, the G-20 
includes China and India, whose export interests clearly differ from those of Latin America. The 
group was brought together by a profound dissatisfaction with existing multilateral rules, as well 
with the continued mercantilist positions of several industrial countries that offered very little in 
agriculture and that additionally wanted negotiations in the new areas of the Singapore agenda. 
 
On the first day of the Cancún meeting the discussions sought to bridge the gap between the G-20 
and the joint text; this effort failed. It is paradoxical that, in the end, it was the Singapore issues and 
not agriculture that brought about the failure in Cancún. Nevertheless it is unlikely that anyone 
could fail to believe that if the Singapore issues had not brought the meeting to an end, agriculture 
would have done so.
47 
 
The failure of the Cancún meeting does not mean the failure of the Doha Round, but it is too 
early to speculate as to where the negotiations are heading. At the present juncture (early 2004), 




B.  Prospects of Regionalism: Mercosur’s Labyrinth in a World of Domino Regionalism 
Figure VI.1 indicates that the number of regional trade agreements notified to the WTO continues 
to grow. In this dynamic regional process, Mercosur has lost momentum to an extent that is likely 
____________ 
47  For Sunday, September 14, the closing day, Luis Derbez, Chairman of the Cancún meeting, put the Singapore 
issues at the top of the agenda, to be followed later by agriculture. Nevertheless, the Meeting ended abruptly during 
discussion of the Singapore issues, which separated the EU from the "no Singapore topics" position of several African 
countries. 51 
to entail increasing costs for the member countries. Since its creation in 1991, Mercosur has signed 
FTAs only with Bolivia, Chile and Peru, while other countries have moved faster. As Section IV 
indicates, some of the new agreements have had significant negative export consequences for the 
Mercosur countries. In addition to the negative effects of NAFTA, and of the successive enlargements 
of the EU, other important trading partners have signed FTAs that will probably entail further 
losses.
48 Important Mercosur trading partners that have continued to sign FTAs include Canada, 
Chile,





















There are two reasons why the Mercosur should be seriously concerned with this trend. The first 
refers to the trade diversion effects that each additional regional agreement has on the Mercosur 
countries’ agricultural exports; Section V provides many examples of how this is happening.
50 
The second concerns the additional protectionist effects of rules of origin, which could be hidden 
in the regional agreements to the benefit of powerful domestic lobbies in the member countries 
and to the detriment of their consumers and non-member countries. There are many rules of 
origin, not all of which have the same protectionist effect, but as Krueger [1997] points out: "all 
of these rules give rise to problems of bureaucratic implementation and interpretation", and "they 
provide an opportunity for representatives of individual interest groups to lobby to avoid competition 
from imports" (p. 15). Since each expansion of existing trade agreements opens up opportunities 
for lobbying by the industries of the member countries, it is likely that the price of entering an 
____________ 
48  It is sometimes argued that FTAs also have positive dynamic effects on non-member countries. It is an open 
question whether the increasing number of overlapping FTAs has created positive dynamic effects that offset the 
negative effects of trade diversion on Mercosur. In any case, in the presence of trade diversion, members of FTAs 
benefit more than non-members; this is what is to be highlighted here. 
49  Chile’s regional policies are analyzed in Harrison, et al. [2001]. 
50  Several observers have concluded that trade diversion effects comprise one of the main reasons for the proliferation 





















the WTO 52 
agreement rises for each new entrant. The precise protectionist effects that rules of origin might 
have had on the exports of efficient agricultural exporters remains to be studied. 
 
This dynamic process of regionalism is expected to continue unabated for the foreseeable future. 
Even Asian countries, which until recently had maintained a strong multilateral stance, are starting 
to advance projects for strengthened regional agreements. This process seems to have gained 
momentum since the United States began discussions on an FTA with Singapore. The countries of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have started discussions for an FTA with 
China, which in turn is likely to enter into further negotiations with other countries. If the trend 
begun by the US-Singapore negotiations continues to gather strength in Asia, the WTO is likely 
to suffer as Asian support for the multilateral system weakens.
51 
 
What explains Mercosur’s slow progress in reaching regional agreements with new prospective 
members? Consider three hypothesis: (i) its strong comparative advantage in agriculture; (ii) the 
resources and energy devoted to deepening the agreement while relegating business-oriented 
policies; and (iii) the serious macroeconomic disequilibria among the Mercosur member countries. 
A few comments serve to illustrate some of the forces at work. First, Mercosur offered to conclude 
an FTAbut this position was never acceptable to the EU. The negotiations with the EU are at an 
impasse, in part because of the crisis in Mercosur but mostly because the EU is willing to negotiate 
only a very mercantilist agreement, whereby it seeks free trade in all goods in exchange for what 
is essentially free trade only in manufactured products (Nogués [2003]).
52 
 
Other issues fall within the set of what can be called deepening goals and institutional constraints. 
The list of actions and policies to deepen Mercosur is certainly not short, ranging from the elimination 
of a substantial number of NTBs (such as antidumping measures and trade constraints arising 
from technical barriers and sanitary measures) to the introduction of a common currency. Bouzas 
and Soltz [2001] discuss Mercosur’s institutional shortcomings, including inadequate dispute-
settlement mechanism and the declining credibility of decisions made at the negotiating table, 
which are never transposed into the members’ domestic legislation. The time and energy that 
government officials devote to resolving these problems has been very substantial but quite 
unproductive, the main reason being the serious macroeconomic disequilibria in the member 
countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil. These disequilibria reached a point of maximum tension 
in 2001, when the overvaluation of the Argentine currency peaked just before the devaluation of 
early 2002. These serious exchange rate misalignments created severe tensions when Argentina 
had to negotiate a waiver from the other Mercosur members in order to increase the common 
external tariff on consumer goods (Nogués [2002]). In the absence of sustainable macroeconomic 
conditions, the Mercosur members will continue to suffer instability and trade policy will continue 
to be used as an instrument to offset exchange rate misalignments. 
 
____________ 
51  East Asian economies are very open and for them, the best trading arrangement is one of multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
52  Note that Mercosur protects its agriculture through ad valorem tariffs, so the EU already has far greater access to 
Mercosur than the latter has to the EU. The latter has never offered free trade in agricultural products to any of the 
partners with which it has signed FTAs, including the CEECs. This has prompted one author to conclude that signing 
an FTA with the EU has many elements of wishful thinking (McQueen [2002]). In this sense, the Mercosur countries 
made a mistake if they ever thought that the EU will actually sign a real FTA. 53 
C.  The Fourth Pillar 
Since around the time that the Uruguay Round concluded, the EU has been offering arguments 
and analysis on a number of issues for which it seeks new multilateral rules as part of the Doha 
Round. In essence, all of these arguments imply the construction of what has been called the 
fourth pillar of the EU’s protectionist policies. Table VI.5 presents a list of this pillar’s elements. 
First, the EU seeks to enhance product safety rules that would allow a much more discretionary 
use of the precautionary principle than is the case under the existing rules. In initiatives such as 
banning genetically modified organisms, the EU is already at fault since it has failed to offer 
strong scientific evidence that they are harmful to human or animal health. A second aim is to 
extend the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade so as to include rules on labeling and 
traceability, which will increase the costs of exports to efficient agricultural producers. Finally, 
the EU seeks to include the concepts of rural development, the environment and animal welfare 
in the Doha Round’s new Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
 
TABLE VI. 5 
NON- TRADE CONCERNS 
Concern  Cairns Group  US  EU 
       
Food Safety  Silent  Silent  Clarify article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement 
       
       
Labeling  Silent  Silent  Clarify article 2 of the TBT 
Agreement 
       
       
Rural Development  Silent  Silent  Include under the coverage of 
the Agreement on Agriculture 
       
       
Environment  Silent  Silent  Include under the coverage of 
the Agreement on Agriculture 
       
       
Animal Welfare  Silent  Silent  Include in green box 
       
Source: Argentina’s Secretariat of Agriculture. 
 
 
D.  Prospects from Preferential Policies 
Section V offered several reasons why new preference policies such as "Everything But Arms" 
and the AGAO are more likely to damage exports from middle-income agricultural producers 
than was the case with past policies. Practically all proposals at the Doha negotiations, including 
those of the Cairns Group and the United States, support special and differential treatment for 
poor developing countries. The first modalities draft of the Doha agricultural negotiations, which 
presumably takes a middle position among all agricultural proposals, recommends a number of 
policies that would harm middle-income exporters. Most notable is an exception to the tariff 
reduction scheme for industrial countries: "tariff reduction affecting long-standing preferences in 
respect of products which are of vital export importance for developing country beneficiaries of 
such schemes may be implemented in equal annual installments over a period of (eight) instead 
of (five) years by the preference granting participants" (WTO [2003]). This might be the first 
time in the history of the GATT-WTO trading system that multilateral liberalization policies are 
subordinated to unilateral preference policies. If this proposal is adopted, the blow to middle-
income agricultural producers will be twofold: reduced exports to poor countries, and reduced 54 
exports to rich countries. The modalities draft also proposes special and differential policies that 
help poor countries to attain food self-sufficiency. These include an open-ended list of products to 




For the Mercosur countries, the conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis are discouraging. 
On the one hand they face little if any chance of leaving the Doha Round with a balanced exchange 
of concessions, one that includes a significant liberalization of world agricultural trade flows. 
There is some likelihood that precisely the opposite might happen -namely, that the fourth pillar 
of the CAP being erected by the EU will raise additional barriers to the region’s exports as is 
occurring with the ban on GMOs-. 
 
Similarly, the Mercosur countries have shown little capacity to adapt to a world in which regional 
trade agreements continue to flourish. Each new agreement signed by a NAFTA member, each 
new enlargement of the EU, each new deepening of existing agreements, erodes the Mercosur 
countries’ agricultural competitiveness. This is particularly true inasmuch as the protection of 
agriculture remains very high in most countries. 
 
What can these countries do in these circumstances? As mentioned earlier, the Mercosur countries 
have to maintain a strong stance in the Doha negotiations. What precisely can be done is discussed 
in the final section. At the same time, Mercosur is beset by an incapacity to expand its export 
opportunities by means of new regional agreements. In this situation the active negotiation of the 





VII.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE FTAA FOR AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
The proposal to establish the FTAA currently stands as the salient opportunity to open up regional 
agricultural markets of some products. This section addresses two main issues: what is at stake for 
agricultural products in the FTAA, and at what costs would enhanced market access be achieved. 
 
 
A.  Agriculture in the FTAA 
The few studies to have estimated the income and trade effects of agricultural liberalization under 
the FTAA are based on CGE models. Such models provide an indication of potential impacts but 
should not be used as substitutes for detailed, in-country analysis of what might be the economic 
effects of the FTAA’s agricultural negotiations. These latter analyses, not the numbers spawned 
by general equilibrium models, should be used in Latin America’s internal debates about the 
benefits and costs of the FTAA. Only governments working closely with their dairy industries, 
for example, can come to know with precision the range of trade barriers and other current or 
potential threats the industry faces in export markets, as well as the constraints on expanding 
investment in the sector and on supporting the employment of workers from industries that will 
contract. Such studies raise questions and provide tentative answers that cannot be addressed in 
CGE models. Unfortunately, Latin American countries have still not undertaken these exercises, 
which poses a serious problem.
53 
 
With this clarification, note some of the main insights provided by Monteagudo and Watanuki 
[2002]. Their study assumes that only trade in agriculture is liberalized. It includes 16 sectors: 
wheat, cereal grains, vegetables and fruits, oilseeds and soybeans, sugar, plant-based fibers, coffee 
and tea, bovine cattle, other animal products, bovine meat, poultry meat, vegetable oils, dairy 
products, beverages and tobaccos, and other food products. The estimates include the elimination 
of the three main policy distortions: barriers to market access; domestic support; and export 
subsidies. The results show that the main impact of the FTAA stems from the removal of barriers 
to market access, while the removal of the other distortions have only minor effects. To provide a 
broad picture, the focus here is on the elimination of barriers to market access.
54 
 
Table VII.1 shows ad valorem tariffs, which include the equivalent effects of specific, mixed tariffs 
and tariff rate quotas levied mainly by Canada, the United States and Mexico. Looking first at the 
weighted averages, Argentina has the lowest protection while Mexico and Central America have 
the highest. Chile and the Andean Community also use price bands to protect many agricultural 
products, but these have apparently not been included in the estimates;
55 to this extent the figures 
for these countries are underestimated. The figures also indicate sectors protected with high 
____________ 
53  An indication of what countries could be doing is provided by the kind of estimates and analysis being prepared by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which looks at the potential gains of the FTAA for an extensive 
list of agricultural products. Without a detailed assessment on a product-by-product basis, it is risky to estimate the 
adjustment costs of the FTAA for each country (Burfisher and Jones [1998]). 
54  Other research indicates that the salient agricultural policies with the greatest costs are those that limit market 
access. See, for example, Casaburi and Sanchez [2000]. 
55  Chile, for instance, has a uniform tariff of 11% but it has price bands for cereal products that increase protection 
well above this level. 56 
equivalent ad valorem tariffs, particularly in Canada and the United States. In sum, while the 
Americas has clear comparative advantage in agricultural products and a systematic net trade 
surplus (Section II), sectors in several countries are protected with high tariffs and thus trade 




EQUIVALENT AD VALOREM TARIFFS (%) OF 
THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS (1997) (1) 
Commodities  Canada  US  Mexico  Central 
America 
Andean 
Community Argentina  Brazil  Chile 
           
Rice  0.4  4.7  15 28.6  16.4 12.1 13.9  11 
Wheat  34.8 3.9  67 1.2  11.6 6.5 6.5 11 
Cereal  Grains  8.6 0.8  38.4 9.7  12 6.6 6.6 11 
Vegetables  and  Fruits  4.2  5.7 17.9 18.1  15 11.1 11.1  11 
Oilseeds and Soybeans  0  19.3  3.1  4.7  10.6  5.9  5.9  11 
Sugar  6.9 10.4 89.8 29.8  14.4  19 17.2  11 
Plant-based  Fibers  0.9 2.1  10.8 6.9  9.6 8.5 8.2 11 
Coffee  and  Tea  2.7 14.9 10.3  9.7  9.8  9.3  9.4  11 
Bovine  Cattle  0.3 1.5 8.3 7.9  8.8 2.6 2.6 11 
Other Animal Products  13.7  0.6  13  12.5  11.6  9.2  9.3  11 
Primary (weighted)  4.3  8.2  9.4  12.4  11.9  7.1  8.2  11 
            
            
Bovine  Meat  15.6  5.6  34.7  17.5 16.5 12 12  11 
Poultry  Meat  66.2  3.7 68.3 34.3  17.3 13.9 13.9  11 
Vegetable  Oils  11.1  4.7 19.2 12.9  14.9 12.2 11.9  11 
Dairy  Products  133.4 22.2 41.5 37.3  17.9 18.2 19.9  11 
Beverage  and  Tobaccos  13.6 17.6 32.3 22.6  17.3  21 21.1  11 
Other  Food  Products  15.8 10.1 19.9 16.2  16.2 15.2 15.3  11 
Processed (weighted)  22.4  12.3  32.9  21.9  16.5  14.4  16.9  11 
            
            
Average (weighted)  16.0  11.1  26.4  18.2  14.5  10.9  12.7  11 
           
Note: (1) The sectoral ad valorem protection rates are estimated as the simple average of the corresponding tariff line schedules. 
For countries and regions in the Western Hemisphere, data include ad valorem, and equivalents of specific, mixed and TRQs. 
Source: Monteagudo and Watanuki [2002]. 
 
 
Table VII.2 shows the impact of tariff elimination on exports by country, measured as the percentage 
change from the base year (1997). The results indicate that while the highest export increases are 
recorded for Argentina and Chile in both processed and agricultural products, all countries in the 
region -including Canada and the United States- would gain.
56 
 
In short, agricultural liberalization in the FTAA would offer gains to most members, although for 
some of the most efficient producers (such as Argentina) these are only a fraction of the gains they 
____________ 
56  It is interesting to note that the gains from the FTAA reported in Burfisher and Jones [1998] for agricultural trade 
are less than those presented here. This study illustrates what was said earlier about the importance of Latin American 
countries carrying out their own analysis. 57 
could achieve in an FTA with the EU or an ambitious liberalization in the Doha Round. Unlike 
trade liberalization in the Western Hemisphere, however, which is an achievable proposition, neither 





IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL TARIFF REFORM ON TOTAL EXPORTS 
(Percentage change from base) 
Commodities  Canada  US  Mexico  Central 
America 
Andean 
Community Argentina  Brazil  Chile 
           
Rice  0.00 17.13 76.77  8.13  13.82  7.35  -0.02  0.00 
Wheat  2.67 0.75 1.08 4.74  17.92  -0.83  -0.43 0.00 
Cereal  Grains  1.22 2.64 6.72  -0.04  14.92 1.66 5.16 2.75 
Vegetables  and  Fruits  6.83 3.55 1.47 4.02  4.96 1.66 8.72 8.31 
Oilseeds and Soybeans  5.00  0.92  37.13  18.50  5.92  4.67  2.15  44.51 
Sugar  23.72 31.13 12.23 15.66  14.31 23.37  4.38  0.85 
Plant-based  Fibers  2.55 2.00 3.98 4.62  4.81 1.56  3.9  -0.50 
Coffee  and  Tea  2.33 2.69 2.94 5.67  5.20  12.34 1.97  14.66 
Bovine  Cattle  1.00 0.79 0.84 7.52  8.12  12.93  17.57  23.08 
Other  Animal  Products  0.46 2.76 0.51 7.66  5.81 1.14 2.14 3.28 
Primary  2.86  2.51  2.48  7.76  6.47  2.28  2.81  7.40 
           
                          
Bovine  Meat  6.89 4.25 0.29  12.49  10.94 4.65 0.76 9.56 
Poultry  Meat  3.86 7.81 3.46  16.45  11.15  10.72 3.55  24.93 
Vegetable  Oils  -0.17 7.60 5.32  17.04  6.95 3.57 0.95  22.44 
Dairy  Products  17.46 22.79 46.13 40.39  23.49 14.90  9.69 42.07 
Beverage  and  Tobaccos  4.28 3.36 5.16  22.74  23.16  21.36  42.49  30.62 
Other  Food  Products  8.19  4.97 10.25 12.85  7.26 14.34 21.14 13.85 
Processed  6.47  5.63  8.42  16.20  8.79  7.48  9.24  17.21 
           
                          
Agriculture  4.49  3.93  5.01  10.21  7.42  5.32  5.62  13.55 
           
Source: Monteagudo and Watanuki [2002]. 
 
 
B.  Other Possible Benefits and Costs of the FTAA 
For Latin America, the benefits and costs of the FTAA for agricultural trade can be grouped into 
two categories: expanded market access opportunities and greater bargaining leverage.
57 Finally, 
it is interesting to note that the FTAA will redirect exports and in this sense will help diversify 
markets, thus lessening the external vulnerability of many Latin American countries. The potential 
costs of the FTAA include the continued agricultural protectionism of Canada and the United 
States in the form of export subsidies and domestic assistance policies. Costs may also arise from 
other items included in the agenda such as intellectual property and government procurement. 
____________ 
57  There will also be gains from stronger institutional links among countries with different levels of development 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal [2002]). Berg and Krueger [2002] survey the potential gains of institutional strengthening 
effects. 58 
Benefits 
Table VII.2 presents estimates of possible FTAA-induced export gains. Three comments should 
be added. First, in bilateral negotiations with Latin American countries, the United States has 
displayed a capacity to reduce agricultural protection; Mercosur has not been successful, as 
evidenced by the successive delays in FTA negotiations with the Andean Community. The United 
States lowered trade barriers in NAFTA to dismantle Mexican agricultural protection of important 
products, including wheat (Cerro and Velez [2000]). In the recently completed negotiations between 
the United States and Chile, the United States announced that it had dismantled the price bands 
for regional trade in several agricultural products (http://www.ustr.gov). Likewise in the FTA with 
Central America. 
 
Second, there are gains to be made in market access from more predictable sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations. As discussed in Section VI, while the EU insists on introducing the precautionary 
principle into multilateral rules, the United States is opposed not only to the principle but to other 
protectionist proposals in the new areas. As net agricultural exporters, Latin American countries 
have much to gain from standing by the US position. As part of the FTA, moreover, the United 
States has agreed to help Chile and Central America in the area of sanitary measures; such 
assistance could be expanded as part of the FTAA. 
 
Third, the Americas already features an increasingly complex web of regional trade agreements 
and there is every indication that, in the absence of the FTAA, this process will continue. Each of 
these agreements has the potential to expand agricultural protection to the detriment of non-
member countries. The existing agreements include hundreds of rules of origin that have posed 
problems of interpretation, with protectionist effects (Estevadeordal [2002]). 
 
Finally, as regards negotiating strengths, recall that to date the outcomes of multilateral trade 
negotiations have been closer to the EU position than to those of the United States or the Cairns 
Group. This was the case in the Uruguay Round (Finger and Nogués [2002]) and, as mentioned 
earlier, is likely to be the case in the Doha Round. The FTAA promises to unite a whole continent 
against agricultural protectionism of the type practiced by the EU and Japan. It is unclear whether 
this coalition will be successful in convincing these countries that they must apply more rational 
agricultural trade policies, but it certainly has a greater prospect of succeeding than do the FTAA 




On agricultural policies, the costs of the FTAA concern the continued use of export subsidies by 
the United States and Canada, and the domestic assistance policies that they can also finance and 
implement. On export subsidies, there appears to be a quite unanimous agreement among the 
FTAA countries that they should be dismantled.
58 The questions appear to center more on when 
____________ 
58  On this policy, the United States seeks to "…eliminate agricultural export subsidies on trade in the Hemisphere 
and pursue a mechanism that will support achieving the US objective in the WTO negotiations of eliminating all export 
subsidies on agricultural products, while maintaining the right to provide bona fide food aid and preserving US 
agricultural market development and export credit programs" (Zoellick [2002a]). 59 
and how fast than on whether. Nevertheless, there are a few issues on which there seem to be 
some differences. The first relates to the question of which policies should and should not be 
considered export subsidies in hemispheric trade. In particular, the negotiations have uncovered 
differences as to whether export credits and export credit guarantees and insurance programs are 
subsidies. One group of countries argues that these policies do not provide subsidies, simply 
because they are not banned by the WTO; others believe the contrary. This discussion should not 
be driven by rule-making lawyers but by sound economics, and in this sense it should be relatively 
straightforward to clarify the role played by credit guarantees. The draft FTAA Agreement on 
Agriculture already includes an annex with a long list of regulations that presumably prevent such 
policies from granting subsidies. Even if this is the case, Latin America is a cash-poor region with 
little if any capacity for financing subsidies. Furthermore, most countries in the region have a 
weak capacity to monitor compliance with the application of the rules. Hence the use of policies 
like export credit guarantees and insurance programs in the FTAA is more likely to harm Latin 
America than the United States and Canada. They should therefore be dismantled for hemispheric 
trade flows. 
 
At the end of the UR’s implementation period, the following are the amounts of export subsidies 
(and share in total) allowed by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: EU, US$8,496 million (61.9%); 
the United States, US$929 million (4.4%); Mexico, US$748 million (3.5%); Canada, US$567 
million (2.7%); rest of the world, US$10,593 million (27.5%).
59 These sizable amounts of legalized 
subsidies have posed two additional problems in the FTAA negotiations: (i) how to treat hemispheric 
imports that are subsidized by third countries; and (ii) how to treat exports to third markets that 
compete with subsidized exports from third countries. Among the bracketed proposals on the first 
point, the present author sympathizes with the one whereby FTAA countries agree to apply 
countervailing duties to subsidized imports. There is also a proposal that if this does not happen, 
FTAA countries could subsidize their exports to the importing member country. Latin America 
has little capacity to match rich countries’ subsidies; there is a risk that while the United States 
and Canada could do this, such an endeavor would displace exports from other FTAA countries 
to the importing member country. To sum up, the best FTAA would entail no export subsidies in 
hemispheric trade and an agreement to apply countervailing measures to subsidized imports from 
third countries in the most expeditious way allowed by the WTO countervailing duties agreement. 
 
The second problem, exports to third markets that compete with subsidized exports from third 
countries, is more difficult to tackle. Among the proposals made so far, the call for consultations 
before member countries decide to match subsidies is reasonable. Obviously, progress in the 
negotiations on dismantling export subsidies in the Doha Round would lessen the problems of 
unfair trade in the formation of the FTAA. As discussed below, however, the EU remains opposed 
to this, despite agreement by the United States and the Cairns Group that export subsidies must 
be dismantled. FTAA countries should therefore be prepared for the EU (in particular) to continue 





59  Data from Argentina’s Secretariat of Agriculture. 
60  At the end of the peace clause (Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture) in December 2003, the FTAA countries 
will be better placed to initiate cases in the WTO dispute-settlement body. In this regard, the EU should not succeed in 
its attempt to extend the deadline of this clause.  60 
Although the FTAA talks include domestic assistance policies, the United States and Canada are 
pushing for their reduction in the Doha Round. If little or no progress is made in the WTO talks, 
some Latin American exports will be at risk. Take, for example, the case of honey, of which 
Argentina is a major exporter. Through non-recourse loans, the recent US Farm Bill has assured 
beekeepers (and other producers of selected commodities) a minimum purchase price; as has 
happened in the past, this could become heavily subsidized (Alberta [2001]). This might happen 




Finally, costs are also likely to arise if agreement in other agenda items is reached in line with the 
positions proposed by the US. The salient example is intellectual property but several countries 
such as Argentina and Brazil, worry that costs may also have to be paid if concessions are given 
in areas such as government procurement and investment as required by the US (Nogués [2003a]). 
 
To sum up, if the FTAA succeeds in dismantling the region’s barriers to market access of agricultural 
products, there will be important gains to be reaped but the costs that will have to be paid for this 
remain unclear. At the recent Miami Summit, Argentina and Brazil raised serious doubts about 
the benefits of some FTAA agenda topics and as a consequence, the final format of the FTAA is 
currently under review. In the meantime, the US has completed FTAs with Chile and Central 
America in line with its demands. Clearly, it is US agricultural producers who will be benefiting 
from these agreements in many instances, at the expense of Mercosur’s exports. Clearly, the 
tradeoffs are rapidly changing and Mercosur has to factor this changing environment when deciding 




61  The FTAA negotiations should include the effects of the Farm Bill and Latin America should demand compensation. 
This proposal is independent of the fact that the Farm Bill is within the range of policies acquired by the United States 
in the UR. If the true spirit of the FTAA is embraced through integration, then a bad WTO agreement such as the AA 
should not become an obstacle to the vision in the Western Hemisphere. 61 
VIII. POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
The single-undertaking rule of the Uruguay Round, take it or leave the GATT-WTO multilateral 
system, was a kiss of death to agricultural exporters particularly of temperate zones like the 
Mercosur countries. To some extent, the Agreement on Agriculture improved transparency and this 
is put prominently by observers that remain positive with the outcome of this Round. Nevertheless, 
many other policies green-lighted by this Agreement opened the door to highly distortionary 
policies that have allowed agricultural protectionism to increase particularly in industrial countries 
after this round was completed. In my view, the URAA is the worst in the history of the GATT-WTO. 
 
Once burned, twice wise and the Mercosur countries are now negotiating with far greater 
determination than in the Uruguay Round. This is great news which unfortunately may come too 
late. For example, in the Doha Round Brazil and Argentina have joined the G-20 and stand firm 
in demand for a more open multilateral system. Essentially, their position is that no agreement is 
far better than another unbalanced outcome. Also, under the pressure of the Mercosur countries, in 
the FTAA negotiations, the single-undertaking rule has been abandoned. The first policy suggestion 
is for the Mercosur countries to maintain the firm stance that they have taken as defined in the G-20 
position. Accepting anything less will probably involve more costs than benefits. No agreement is 
better than another unbalanced outcome like the UR but if this is the final outcome, then the 
Mercosur countries will have to live with the URAA probably for decades to come. 
 
A second suggestion is to strengthen the demands of the Mercosur countries in negotiations with 
industrial countries with further empirical analysis of the costs inflicted by their protectionist policies. 
Two effects for which there is practically no evidence are in the area of social impacts (poverty 
and distribution), and the solvency implications. Important trade policies like the GSP, AGOA and 
Everything but Arms are implemented with a clear poverty-reduction focus. At the same time, 
industrial countries’ agricultural policies have impoverished the Mercosur countries but this is 
nowhere demonstrated with professionalism. This knowledge-vacuum should end. 
 
A third suggestion is for the Mercosur countries to demand that debt and trade be included as a 
negotiating topic. The line of reasoning that links these two issues is simple. Rich countries’ trade 
barriers reduce exports and worsens the solvency indicators of efficient producers thus raising 
domestic interest rates which in turn lowers growth. Clearly trade and debt are more closely linked 
than other areas that are currently being negotiated like trade and intellectual property, and trade 
and environment which are two areas of interest to industrial countries. Bringing trade and debt 
into the negotiations would also tilt the political-economy in favor of liberalization. Creditors in 
industrial countries would become a force against powerful agricultural lobbies and would argue 
that if the barriers that protect these groups are not lowered, they would likely not cash all of 
their loans. 
 
A fourth policy suggestion is to use the opportunity opened by the expiration of the Peace Clause 
to initiate cases under the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO against subsidy policies with clear 
negative effects on Mercosur’s exports. The media has reported that cases are being analyzed and 
initiating these cases would begin to document just how costly these industrial country policies are. 
In this regard, countries in the region should not feel weakened by the political clout of industrial 
countries’ negotiators. 62 
A fifth suggestion is for Mercosur to remain alert of the negative consequences of RTAs to which 
it is not a party. Based on sound evidence, compensation should be sought for actions such as the 
forthcoming expansion of the EU. It is recognized that RTAs generally have negative consequences 
on non-members and the evidence presented above indicates that this is all the more likely, the 
higher the protection afforded by the member countries. This is precisely the case in temperate 
agricultural products in most RTAs to which Mercosur is not a member. 
 
As said, regionalism could produce results that are superior to the very poor outcomes of the 
multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless so far, the regional policies of the Mercosur countries have 
not been successful in knocking down agricultural trade barriers. On the contrary, the analysis 
shows several examples of how regional policies by many non-member countries have had clear 
negative effects on agricultural exports of member countries. The failure of Mercosur in expanding 
its regional outreach suggests that it is becoming an agreement that has ceased to create business 
and growth opportunities to the member countries. Two policy suggestions stem from here. 
 
The first is based on the fact that in recent years, the dynamic markets for agricultural exports 
have been the developing countries. This apparently contrasts with the allocation of resources of 
Latin America’s Governments which have been mainly allocated to negotiations with industrial 
countries. The highly mercantilistic stance of these countries is another reason why more attention 
has to be paid to integration with other developing countries. The recent announcement of a trade 
agreement between Mercosur and some of the Andean countries apparently represents a good 
example. Ongoing efforts to cement closer ties with China, India and other developing countries 
with weak comparative advantage in temperate agriculture, could become promising negotiations. 
 
Second, as discussed in the previous section, in the forthcoming months the focus of attention 
will be the FTAA. Several elements in the agenda look promising, but others may entail costs. 
Two sources of gains come from the fact that the FTAA will knock down regional agricultural 
barriers to market access which among the three pillars of agricultural protectionism, inflict the 
greatest losses to Mercosur. Also, one agreement covering the whole hemisphere should streamline 
the criss-crossing of an increasing number of protectionist rules of origin that continue to erect 
barriers. On the negative side, informed criticisms have been raised to the refusal of the US to 
negotiate agricultural subsidies and antidumping regulations. In this regard, Mercosur countries 
must remain firm but flexible to positions of being compensated for reforms that remain politically 
difficult for the US. Other agenda topics where Argentina and Brazil have raised concerns and 
objections include intellectual property and government procurement. As a consequence, and 
from the standpoint of these countries, the overall balance of the FTAA is being reassessed. In 
this analysis, account must be taken of the fact that the US continues to sign FTAs with Chile, 
Central America and is concluding negotiations with the Andean countries. All of these agreements 
continue to raise the costs to Mercosur of remaining in the borderline of the FTAA. In this dynamic 





AGRICULTURAL CHAPTERS OF THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM 
1 Live  animals 
2  Meat and edible meat offal 
3  Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates 
4  Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included 
5  Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or included 
6  Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
7  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 
8  Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melons 
9  Coffee, tea, mate and spices 
10 Cereals 
11  Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
12  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medical plants; straw and fodder 
13  Lacs; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts 
14  Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included 
15  Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes 
16  Preparations of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations 
19  Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products 
20  Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
23  Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder 




FINLAND’S IMPORTS OF HORSE MEAT FROM BRAZIL, EU AND THE WORLD 
(US$ thousands) 
Year  Brazil  EU  World 
     
1990 3,838.1 701.3  4,826.1 
1991 3,169.2 239.5  3,706.5 
1992 4,024.9 221.1  4,584.9 
1993 4,348.2 132.4  4,780.7 
1994 7,852.0 549.9  8,653.4 
1995 2,212.4  8,003.4  10,541.7 
1996  3,980.9 12,009.7 16,171.8 
1997 2,733.5  8,444.6  11,497.7 
1998 1,545.7  9,334.7  11,000.6 
1999 743.8  9,227.6  10,177.1 
2000 738.7  8,397.0  10,624.0 
     
Source: Eurostat and UN statistics. 64 
TABLE A.3 
SWEDEN’S IMPORTS OF HORSE MEAT FROM BRAZIL, EU AND THE WORLD 
(US$ thousands) 
Year  Brazil  EU  World 
     
1990  3,221.0 5,050.7 9,500.9 
1991  2,856.0 4,086.0 8,382.2 
1992  2,504.7 6,060.9 9,478.0 
1993  2,034.1 2,355.8 5,131.5 
1994  5,150.3 2,028.6 7,921.7 
1995  1,081.1 15,961.3 17,638.9 
1996  1,043.7 19,028.3 20,423.4 
1997  86.1 20,540.7 20,839.8 
1998  244.9 15,340.3 15,675.1 
1999 133.0  18,361.665  18,809.4 
2000  144.0 28,832.0 29,145.0 
     




SWEDEN’S IMPORTS OF FROZEN ORANGE JUICE FROM BRAZIL, EU AND THE WORLD 
(US$ thousands) 
Year  Brazil  EU  World 
     
1990 384.1 0.0  905.8 
1991 1,302.9  0.0  2,167.9 
1992 656.8 0.0  1,541.7 
1993 648.5 0.0  1,613.3 
1994 584.5  15.1  1,110.4 
1995 881.6  905.4  2,630.0 
1996  718.7 1,239.4 2,667.2 
1997  447.4 1,692.1 2,429.0 
1998  0.0 1,732.7 1,917.9 
1999  0.0 1,827.5 2,177.0 
2000  360.0 1,911.0 2,316.0 
     
Source: Eurostat and UN statistics. 
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